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EMOTION-ORIENTED PARADIGM OF
LEGAL INSANITY INFORMED BY THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
AND DECISION-MAKING
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Legal insanity is deeply rooted in an intellectualistic conception of the
capacity for moral rationality. The vast majority of insanity standards
essentially consider the integrity of the defendant’s cognitive faculties at the
time of the offense. However, the cognitivist model of legal insanity
collides with the body of neuroscientific and behavioral literature about the
critical role of emotions in moral judgments and decision-making
processes. Drawing upon this scientific knowledge, this Article reforms the
intellectualistic substance of the capacity for moral rationality that
underlies the insanity doctrine by including emotions in its relevant
psychological set. Hence, it provides a revised model of legal insanity, one
that gives more prominence to individuals’ emotional faculties in relation
to the crime committed.
The analysis highlights that the legal
reconsideration of the role of emotions within the capacity for moral
rationality turns the insanity defense into a tripartite, more dimensional
test—one inclusive of emotional, cognitive, and volitional prongs.
Normative arguments in support of the proposed alternative paradigm of
legal insanity are illustrated and discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between neuroscientific disciplines and legal insanity
has never been simple. Many books and articles have been written, many
conferences have been held, and many contrasting views have been
proposed, but the debate continues. On the one side of the spectrum, some
authors have called for neurological defense on the grounds that brain
diseases may excuse the crime. 1 At the other end of the spectrum, some

1
See, e.g., Richard Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 53(2006) (arguing in favor of a
return to control tests for insanity “that comport with modern neuroscience research on the
role of brain dysfunction in impulsive criminal behavior”).
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scholars have expressed concern that brain images and scans can actually
mislead juries, giving them the wrong impression that the brain is wholly
responsible for human behavior, which may allow for criminal conduct to
be excused based on any brain abnormality in the defendant. 2 The lack of
resolution of these disputes makes ambiguous the contribution of
neuroscience to legal insanity, even at the theoretical level. This Article
attempts to fill this gap and proposes one possible approach by which
neuroscientific knowledge may plausibly contribute to a rethinking of the
insanity doctrine without causing any dramatic upheaval to the nature of
culpability and criminal responsibility.
Brain mechanisms do not alone account for an individual’s (lack of)
culpability. Culpability and insanity are not neuroscientific concepts, nor
can they be localized in certain neural patterns. 3 Yet, although brain
mechanisms cannot provide an answer to normative questions about
culpability and criminal responsibility, 4 these physical features may become
integral to discussions of culpability (and the lack thereof), as long as they
contribute to a better understanding of the processes that underlie the
capacities necessary for one to be considered culpable. This consideration
of brain mechanisms, once again, does not equate to attributing a normative
significance to neuroscience, nor to claiming that neuroscience could erode
the nature of culpability and criminal responsibility. Rather, neuroscientific
information can be used as a source of knowledge to improve the accuracy
of the legal-psychological assumptions that support notions of culpability.
2

See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND
BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157 (Brent Garland ed., 2004); Michael
Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (“At its most general level, law regulates human behavior. Human
action tout court is just one of many issues within the scope of the neurolaw literature.
Moreover, legal judgments are made by human decision makers, who act and decide based
on reasons, which is just more behavior to be reduced within a neurolaw framework. Given
the strong claims made on behalf of neuroscience, coupled with the growing enthusiasm for
the enterprise, careful scrutiny is warranted.”).
3
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405 (2006) (“The criteria for responsibility are behavioral and
normative, not empirically demonstrable states of the brain . . . . Brains are not held
responsible. Acting people are. To believe that brain evidence has more than simple
evidentiary value for assessing responsibility is to misconceive the criteria for
responsibility.”).
4
See, e.g., Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOL. 0693,
0696–97 (2007) (observing that “[d]etermining criminal responsibility is a normative legal
conclusion, not an empirical factual one, made in the context of a variety of often conflicting
aspirations. Therefore, even the best neuroscientific study can only afford factual evidence to
be weighed alongside . . . normative considerations, rather than actually resolve the legal
question as to which the factual evidence is relevant.”).
THE LAW:
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Over the past thirty years, neuroscience research has greatly advanced
our understanding of the dynamics that underlie decision-making processes
leading to moral conduct. One of most relevant insights emerging from this
research concerns the critical role that emotions and emotional processes
play either in informing or in hindering moral decision-making. 5 In
confirmation of this insight, brain-imaging studies on specific psychiatric
populations characterized by marked antisocial tendencies have found links
between these conditions and abnormal structure or functioning of the same
socio-emotional brain circuits that appear to be significantly involved in
moral decision-making. 6 Altogether, consistent with behavioral studies,
research in neuroscience supports the view that emotions are crucial
mediators for moral behavior; that is, moral behavior also depends largely
on proper and balanced emotional functioning. 7
This Article specifically uses this branch of neuroscientific knowledge
to revise the cognitivist model of the capacity for moral rationality, which
lies at the core of the insanity defense. It provides an alternative model of
legal insanity: one that gives more prominence to individuals’ emotional
faculties in relation to the crime committed. Additionally, it offers several
arguments for why an emotion-oriented model of legal insanity—informed
by scientific knowledge—is normatively plausible.
The argument offered here proceeds as follows. Part I traces the
cognitivist model of insanity in contemporary criminal law. It begins with
a preliminary discussion of the intellectualistic view of the capacity for
moral rationality, which forms the benchmark of culpability and criminal
responsibility. As will be made plain, the capacity for moral rationality
consists of one’s ability to engage in instrumental practical reasoning
dictated by moral reasons. Importantly, in the eyes of the law, the capacity
for moral rationality is entirely governed by cognitive faculties. Therefore,
agents may be considered culpable as long as they possess intact cognitive
faculties that enable them to know or understand the meaning of their
unlawful conduct and willfully choose to engage in that unlawful conduct
accordingly. In sum, cognition is the only mental dimension that defines
the legally relevant mind. Part I subsequently explores how the intellectbased understanding of the capacity for moral rationality is reflected in the
insanity doctrine. By analyzing formulations of insanity standards, it
highlights that insanity tests are fundamentally focused on the evaluation of
a defendant’s cognitive faculties at the time of the offence. On the one

5
6
7

See infra Part III.
Id.
Id.
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hand, cognitive defects are considered responsible for a defendant’s lack of
knowledge, or understanding, of the factual and moral meaning of the
offense (cognitive prong of legal insanity). On the other hand, by impairing
defendants’ capacity for comprehension, cognitive defects are also assumed
to affect their capacity to control their impulses (volitional prong of legal
insanity).
Part II provides further support for the criminal law’s adherence to an
intellectualistic model of legal insanity by analyzing the negligible role that
emotions are afforded within the evaluation of insanity. In line with this
rationalist perspective, criminal law manifests a view that emotions make
no positive contribution to moral rational reasoning. It presupposes that
emotions are mental occurrences that, when excessively intense, can
provoke sudden loss of control.
The negative relationship between emotions and the capacity for moral
rationality is echoed in insanity standards in two ways. First, insanity
standards do not provide an emotional capacity test, which is to say, a test
measuring a defendant’s capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral
significance of the offence. Second, insanity standards give prominence to
self-control impairments as long as they are linked to a defect of cognitive
faculties. On the contrary, self-control impairments arising from emotional
disturbance are usually considered as mitigating circumstances, to be
considered in the sentencing phase or as limited diminished-capacity
conditions, such as the common law “heat of passion” and the Model Penal
Code’s (MPC’s) “extreme emotional disturbance” (EED). The diminished
weight of emotion in such an evaluation, as I contend, is for one
fundamental reason: because emotions are not treated as mental factors that
contribute to one’s capacity for moral rationality, a lack of self-control due
to emotional impairment is not viewed as the kind of moral rationality
defect that can justify an excuse.
Part III measures the rationalist model of legal insanity against
neuroscientific insights into the role of emotions in moral judgments and
decision-making. Its objective is not to carry out a detailed literature
review of neuroscientific studies. Rather, and more narrowly, it aims to use
relevant neuroscientific literature to emphasize two main mistaken
assumptions about moral decision-making and behavior emerging from the
current intellect-based model of legal insanity. First, it outlines that in
moral judgments and decision-making processes, emotional faculties play a
role equally critical to that of cognitive faculties. Notably, it emphasizes
that emotions and emotional faculties influence moral judgments and
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decision-making at both subconscious and conscious levels 8 and, thus, that
cognitive faculties alone cannot give rise to moral decisions without
8
In common language, emotions and feelings are used interchangeably. An emotion is
usually referred to as something that is felt. People generally call an emotion their feeling of
fear, happiness, anger, and so on. However, it is important to note the distinction that
neuroscientists draw between emotions and feelings. Emotions can be defined as “the
process[es] by which the brain determines or computes the value of a stimulus.” JOSEPH
LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 206 (2002). In contrast,
feelings are the subjective experience, or awareness, of said emotional responses. While
emotions are mostly unconscious, feelings imply some degree of awareness (i.e.,
consciousness). When a stimulus occurs, people react subconsciously with their emotions.
Only after the emotion—that is, the automatic response to that stimulus—has occurred do
people become aware of it. This state of awareness is what transforms an emotion into a
feeling. In other words, it is only when people get to a stage of awareness of the processes
activated by an emotion that they have a feeling. Although there is a common view on what
kind of states emotions and feelings are, as well as on the fact that both emotions and
feelings do influence decision-making and behavior, neuroscientists hold heterogeneous
positions on the exact relationship between emotions and feelings. See Joseph LeDoux,
Feelings: What are They and How Does the Brain Make Them?, 144 DAEDALUS, J. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 96 (2015) (suggesting that emotions and feelings serve radically
different functions, and thus cannot be placed on the same level. Emotions are adaptive
responses to critical environmental challenges. An emotional reaction is a pivotal behavior
of all organisms, both human and nonhuman. Emotions form automatic behavioral
responses, motivational states to external stimuli that serve survival functions. However,
emotions do not contribute to the emotional life of an individual. On the other hand, feelings
are the aware and self-reported experience of an emotional response. Feelings are a matter of
consciousness. Consciousness, and therefore prototypical cognitive systems and functions,
are what make us emotional); cf. ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS:
BODY AND EMOTIONS IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 36 (1999) (arguing that feelings are
natural evolutions of emotions. Emotions affect the mind when they evolve into feelings.
Because feelings are the natural sequence of emotions, one’s feeling of a given emotion is
ultimately the emotion per se. Thus, because each feeling is the natural corollary of a
respective emotion, the two things can be referred to by using same names. For instance,
fear can be both an emotion—i.e., a body state of change triggered by an external threat—
and a feeling, i.e., the conscious perception of the body change. While emotions are
evolutionary adaptations, unaware and embodied states that trigger physiological responses
to external stimuli, feelings are nothing more nor less than the conscious perceptions, the
lasting memory, a neural and mental representation of emotions. According to Damasio,
while “emotions-proper” are always unconscious, feelings may or may not involve
consciousness. He spots three stages of emotional processing along a continuum: “a state of
emotion, which can be triggered and executed nonconsciously; a state of feeling, which can
be represented nonconsciously; and a state of feeling made conscious, i.e., known to the
organism having both emotion and feeling”). To put it simply, emotions provoke changes in
the body. These bodily changes are projected and mapped in the brain. Bodily changes may
remain non-conscious or may be experienced consciously as ‘feelings.’ Therefore,
emotionally-salient stimuli may lead to feelings indirectly by triggering an emotion that
causes a change in body state which is subsequently ‘felt.’ The line between the emotion and
the feeling may thus be very blurred. As feelings are the natural sequence of emotions, we
may say that our feeling of a given emotion is ultimately the emotion per se. See also Ralph
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emotional influence. Second, the Article suggests that self-control abilities
depend on their own mechanisms, encompassing many distinct (and
dissociable) cognitive and socio-emotional processes. As such, people’s
capacity for self-control does not necessarily depend on the cognitive
ability to know that a certain action is wrong.
In light of the highlighted scientific insights, Part IV draws up and
proposes a tripartite model for legal insanity which accounts for the
relevance of emotional factors. While the cognitive prong of the insanity
tests remains essentially unaltered, the Article first advocates for the
inclusion of an emotional capacity test—a test measuring defendants’
capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral significance of their conduct—
in insanity standards. Second, it advocates for the recognition of an
independent volitional prong for the test, to measure the defendants’
abilities to make decisions and exercise self-control, regardless of their
intellectual ability to tell right from wrong. Furthermore, Part IV analyzes
the consequences that the expansion of the substance of the volitional prong
to also incorporate emotional components has for the diminished-capacity
doctrine, as it is regulated by both the common law “heat of passion” and
the MPC’s EED standards.
Part V illustrates several arguments that support the normative
plausibility of the new model developed for the insanity defense. In
particular, it argues that an emotion-oriented model of legal insanity not
only better complies with the principle of personal guilt, but also meets the
aims of two major justifications for punishment, namely culpability-based
retribution and rehabilitation.
A final caveat is worth mentioning: this Article uses scientific insights
into moral judgments and decision-making to provide a theoretical model of
legal insanity. Its aim is to interpret knowledge emerging from said
scientific data, and combine that knowledge with legal arguments that
might lead to a theoretical reconsideration of traditional approaches to the
insanity defense. Considering its doctrinal scope, this Article does not
address several practical issues concerning the implementation of this
alternative model of legal insanity in forensic settings. These issues range
from how the newly introduced emotional prong of insanity standards

Adolphs, How Should Neuroscience Study Emotions? By Distinguishing Emotion States,
Concepts, and Experiences, 12 SOC. COGN. & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 24, 27 (2017)
(suggesting that emotions are biological functional states that regulate behavior and allow us
to cope with environmental challenges. However, emotion states are not the same as
conscious experiences of emotion (i.e., feelings). Rather, emotion states cause the conscious
experience of emotions (i.e., feelings). Put this way, feelings are derivative of emotion
states).
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should be assessed through reliable judgments (both empirical and
normative) to how the criminal justice system should appropriately deal
with contentious classes of offenders who could be eligible for the new
insanity defense. These issues are critical, and they will be explored
thoroughly in future works.
I. THE RATIONALISM BEHIND THE INSANITY DOCTRINE
The insanity defense is an affirmative defense whereby criminal
defendants seek to be excused from criminal liability on the grounds that, at
the time of the crime, a mental illness deprived them of their relevant
capacities required for criminal responsibility. 9 In theoretical terms,
insanity is a legal concept, not a medical one.10 While a mental illness
(disease, defect, or disorder, depending on which terminology is adopted) in
the clinical sense generally constitutes the “but for” condition of legal
insanity, it must ultimately satisfy predetermined legal criteria to rise to the
status of insanity. 11 The law is therefore never really interested in mental
illness as such. There must certainly be mental illness, but there is always a
second requirement, namely that the illness be of such form or degree that it
meets certain legal criteria. 12 In sum, it is not a mental illness per se that
provides grounds for excuse. 13 Rather, the determination rests on whether
9

See Stephen J. Morse & Richard Bonnie, Abolition of the Insanity Defense Violates
Due Process, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 488, 489 (“Blame and punishment by the
state are fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of the Due Process Clause if an offender
was not responsible for his crime. The affirmative defense of legal insanity applies this
fundamental principle by excusing those mentally disordered offenders whose disorder
deprived them of rational understanding of their conduct at the time of the crime.”).
10
See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 299, 300 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds.,
2011) (observing that “[i]t is common to think that insanity is a medical condition.
Psychiatrists, however, almost never describe their patients as ‘insane’ or ‘sane.’ . . . It is the
judges and lawyers who have to decide who is insane and which mental conditions make
someone insane. The law classifies some people as sane and others as insane in order to
determine who should be held criminally responsible . . . . In this way, insanity is a legal
concept.”).
11
See, e.g., Paul Robinson, The Effect of Mental Illness Under U.S. Criminal Law, 65 N.
IRL. LEGAL Q. 229, 230 (2014) (observing that “[i]t is not enough for the defense that an
actor suffers from a mental disease or defect, even one that causes some dysfunction. To be
held blameless, the actor’s mental illness must cause effects so strong that it would not be
reasonable to expect the actor to have avoided the criminal law violation.”).
12
HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 45 (1972) (clarifying that
“[w]hen criminal law asks questions concerning mental disease and insanity, it is concerned
with the defendant’s mental capacities with respect to the law”).
13
Belief to the contrary risks giving rise to what Stephen Morse has defined as the
“fundamental psycho-legal error.” See Morse, supra note 3.
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the mental disease compromises the person’s capacity to be and act as a
rational moral agent. 14
The capacity for moral rationality 15 constitutes the benchmark of
culpability and criminal responsibility. 16 For agents to be considered
responsible and therefore deserving of punishment, they must have the
capacity to adopt a decision and make a choice against a system of moral
and legal values. 17 In fact, the fundamental assumption underlying the ideal
of punishing only blameworthy agents is that culpable agents are practical

14
Helen Howard, Diminished Responsibility, Culpability, and Moral Agency, in
MENTAL CONDITION DEFENCES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 318, 321 (Ben Livings,
Alan Reed & Nicola Wake eds., 2015) (“Criminal responsibility will generally require a link
to moral blameworthiness/culpability . . . . Moral blameworthiness, in addition, presupposes
that [an individual] is a rational moral agent who has sufficient understanding of his acts and
deserves moral blame. Therefore, without moral agency there can be no culpability; without
culpability there should be no criminal responsibility.”); see also Peggy Sasso, Criminal
Responsibility in the Age of “Mind-Reading,” 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1193–94 (2009)
(“[A]n individual who possesses those minimal capacities to qualify as a moral agent . . . is
capable of engaging in conduct that rejects the community’s moral norms.”).
15
There are many definitions of rationality. Also, the meaning of rationality depends on
the specific field of study, or context, where this concept is used. To avoid conceptual
confusion, this Article only considers a legal notion of rationality, one which fits the
purposes of criminal law. See Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 251, 252 (2002) (describing [the capacity for moral] rationality as “the ability to
perceive accurately, to get the facts right, to form justifiable beliefs, and to reason
instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately and according to a minimally
coherent preference-ordering. Rationality includes the general ability to recognize good
reasons that should guide action. Put yet another way, it is the ability to act for good
reasons.”); see also Anthony Duff, Answering for Crime, 106 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y
87, 90 (2006) (likewise asserting that we are responsible agents “insofar as we are capable of
grasping and being guided by reasons and of answering for ourselves in terms of reasons.
Responsibility is in play when reasons are in play: we exercise our capacities for responsible
agency in responding to reasons; we are responsible for such exercises, and for our failures
to exercise those capacities when we fail to respond to reasons that bear on our thoughts and
actions.”).
16
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse & Morris Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071,
1117 (2007) (“Rationality is the touchstone of criminal responsibility, as the structure of
criminal law itself indicates. All laws, criminal and civil, make sense and are functional
precisely because they provide action-guiding reasons addressed to potentially rational
creatures . . . . It is simply unfair to hold responsible . . . wrongdoers who . . . were not
capable of being rational at the time of the crime.”).
17
Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5 (2008) (“The law properly
treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not as mechanical forces of nature. Law
and morality are action-guiding and could not guide people ex ante and ex post unless
people could use rules as premises in their practical reasoning.”).
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moral reasoners; 18 they are capable of reasoning instrumentally about facts
as they relate to social, moral, or legal norms and of determining their
conduct by virtue of normative considerations about what they ought or
ought not to do. 19
In the eyes of the law, the capacity for moral rationality—or capacity
for practical moral reasoning—essentially includes two mental prongs:
cognition and volition. 20 The cognitive prong of moral rationality generally
regards the capacity for understanding, or knowing, the factual and moral
significance of a given action performed. 21 Thus, culpable agents are those
18
See, e.g., Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 465 (2012) (assuming without argument that reasons to which persons
must respond in order to become eligible for blame and punishment are indeed moral
reasons. According to Husak, responding to reasons does not solely mean “ability to
conform to moral reasons,” but also to “understand the special motivating force of moral
reasons.”).
19
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Result, and Criminal Responsibility, U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 368 (2004) (arguing that “[l]egal and moral rules are not simply mechanistic
causes that produce “reflex” compliance. They operate within the domain of practical
reason. Agents are meant to and can only use these rules as potential reasons for action as
they deliberate about what they should do. Moral and legal rules thus guide actions primarily
because they provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or
action. Unless people were capable of understanding and then using legal rules as premises
in deliberation, law would be powerless to affect human behavior.”).
20
The inclusion of cognition and volition as the essential prongs of the capacity for
moral rationality has received wide acceptance in various theories of criminal responsibility.
For instance, Herbert Hart’s capacity-responsibility theory describes the relevant capacities
necessary for criminal responsibility as “understanding, reasoning and controlling conduct:
the ability to understand what conduct legal and moral rules require, to deliberate and reach
decisions concerning these requirements; and to conform to decisions when made.” See
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 222
(1967). Endorsing a hybrid version of the character-based and choice-based theories of
criminal responsibility, Antony Duff similarly holds that “someone who is to be held
responsible for his choices must at least be capable of recognizing the relevant empirical
aspects of his actions and its circumstances, and of foreseeing its consequences; he must also
have the kind of ‘instrumental rationality’ which enables him to determine which actions
will serve whatever ends he has.” See Robin Antony Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal
Liability, 12 L. & PHIL. 345, 356 (1993). Elsewhere, Duff argues that control too is an
essential prerequisite of criminal responsibility. Control, according to Duff, “is a matter of
rational capacities: thus I have control over my actions insofar as I have the capacities
necessary to recognize reasons and guide my actions by them, insofar as I am capable of
engaging in practical reasoning and of actualizing its results.” See Robin Anthony Duff, Who
is Responsible, for What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 452 (2005).
21
HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 224–26 (1979) (claiming that “among members of a community
there is a certain valuational ‘background nexus’ of basic perception and basic values.
[Therefore] the basic factual presumption that underlies our expectation that people should
deliberately [act lawfully] is that each individual in the community shares in a practical
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who know or can understand what they are doing and the practical
consequences of their actions, as well as the fact that their actions
contradict society’s morals. 22 On the other hand, volition consists of the
free exercise of choice of a given course of action among conflicting
reasons. 23 Essentially, volition encompasses the capacity to exert selfcontrol and resist impulses to engage in certain conduct. 24 It follows that
culpable agents are those who, having conflicting reasons, can do otherwise
(i.e., they are equipped with the capacity to resist their impulses), but
simply will not do otherwise and thus choose to act upon their antisocial
impulses. 25
Critically, the legal understanding of capacity for moral rationality is
profoundly cognitivist. Embracing the rationalist view of rational thought
and behavior—law-abiding and antisocial alike—endorsed by classical and
neo-classical thinkers, 26 contemporary criminal law presupposes that the

awareness of this background-nexus of basic perceptions and basic values. [For instance]
there is the person who has a practical grasp of the general moral significance of killing, and
who has the sense that it is . . . an issue of deep concern to the law, and generally
forbidden—but who may make a personal judgment that a particular unlawful killing is
acceptable or even desirable. Such a person is rational in regard to the law, even
though . . . in disagreement with it”).
22
Michael Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 65 (“Only
those who have a reasonable awareness of the consequences of their actions . . . may be held
responsible for what they do.”).
23
MARK D. WHITE, THE MISTAKEN QUEST FOR A CONTROL TEST: FOR A RATIONALITY
STANDARD OF SANITY 196 (2017) (“Control (or ‘self-control’) involves the ability to resist an
immediate desire for the sake of one’s values or long-term goals. For a defendant to claim an
incapacity for self-control is essentially to assert that, according to his better judgment, he
did not truly want to commit the crime on the one hand, and his better judgment on the other.
Without such a tension . . . then no reason exists to assert he experienced a defect of will.”).
24
See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1994)
(“‘I couldn’t help myself’; ‘I had no choice’; ‘I couldn’t control myself’; ‘I was forced to do
it.’ All are common explanations used to support the claim that an agent is not morally or
criminally responsible for otherwise culpable conduct. The most common criminal law
‘control’ excuses that instantiate these claims are duress and the so-called ‘volitional’ tests
for legal insanity.”).
25
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-Control,
61 EMORY L. J. 501, 515 (2012) (“[A] criminal is a person who deliberately chooses to
engage in behavior that he knows is wrong; we call this crime because the person could have
chosen not to engage in the behavior. That is, that person could have exercised self-control
over his actions and opted for a different choice.”).
26
See J. M. Canals, Classicism, Positivism, and Social Defense, 50 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 541, 543 (1960); Clarence Jay Jeffrey, The Historical Development of
Criminology, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1959) (discussing generally the main
differences between Classical and Neo-classical schools, and the Positive school of criminal
law and criminology); Raed SA Faqir, The Philosophy of Punishment: A Study to the History
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capacity for moral rationality is entirely governed by the powers of
“reason,” namely the active area of the mind 27 that is usually identified with
cognitive faculties like reasoning, thinking, planning, learning,
understanding, and the like. 28 Thus, contemporary criminal law identifies
“reason”—qua the only source of the capacity for moral rationality—with
the cognitive dimension of the mind. As a synonym for reason and the
highest function of the mind, cognition (and its related faculties) is what
drives conscious decision-making, intention-forming, and planning. It is
also what guides individuals’ practical moral reasoning about what they
ought and ought not to do. 29 Cognition is thus the sole component of the
legally relevant mind.
Put yet another way, contemporary criminal law grounds the notion of
the capacity for moral rationality in rationalist principles to espouse a
cognitive model of culpability. As long as individuals display intact
cognitive faculties, they are presumed to have the capacity to reason
instrumentally about the factual and moral consequences of their conduct,

of Classical and Positive Schools of Penology, 1 FORENSIC RES. CRIMINOL. INT. J., 1, 3-5
(2015); KATHERINE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 7–18 (2012).
27
Christine M. Korsgaard, The Activity of Reason, 83 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL.
ASS’N 23, 30 (2009) (“The faculty of reason is not identified merely as the ability to
recognize and respond to reasons. The faculty of reason is identified rather as the active
dimension of the mind, and rational principles are then identified as those that describe or
constitute rational activity.”); see also CARLSON ANYANGWE, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART 249 (2015) (reporting that “[t]he cognitive functions are our intellectual functions, that
is, our ability to assimilate information from the environment, remember it, organise and
process it in a rational manner, drawing rational conclusions, and making appropriate
decisions. Thus, they include our functions of perception, thinking, reasoning,
understanding, judgement and recall.”).
28
FINGARETTE, supra note 12 at 181–82 (describing reason as “that guiding or directing
faculty of the mind . . . by virtue of which . . . man has traditionally been said to be a
‘rational being.’” Fingarette holds that “the concept of reason has . . . been taken as the
key . . . to man’s thinking, to what are called his cognitive capacities”).
29
See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 83
(1984) (discussing the relationship between wrongdoing and culpability in the context of
negligence, he observes that the negligent actor “is . . . capable of calculating what actions
are likely to lead to what results and even to assign relative probabilities to each. He is, in
other words, a pre-eminent practical reasoner, finding the morally and legally correct major
premises . . . and forming the accurate means/end beliefs . . . for his minor premises . . . . It is
because people have the capacity to reason this way that they can be said to be culpable
when they do not do so.” He further explains that “[the] failure to make the right cost/benefit
calculation” makes people culpable only if they have the capacity to reason this way); see
also ANYANGWE supra note 27 at 249 (“[a] person’s ability to distinguish between right and
wrong; to know when certain conduct would be wrong according to the standards of law,
society and/or morality; and to decide on an appropriate course of action, depends on that
person’s cognitive functions.”).
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as well as to choose to engage in a given conduct—either right or wrong—
rather than in another. 30 As such, they are assumed to be fully accountable
for their behavior.
The preeminent role of cognition (and of cognitive faculties) as the
absolute component of the capacity for moral rationality is markedly
reflected in insanity standards. Insanity tests, as is incontrovertibly
evidenced by the history of conceptions of insanity, are mostly cognition
based. 31 The reason is easy to grasp: if culpability requires that people
possess a sufficient degree of intellectual capacity to reason instrumentally
about the factual and moral consequences of engaging in criminal conduct
and determine their actions accordingly, a lack of culpability can be found
only when these conditions are not met. The sub-sections that follow
explore these claims in more detail. They do so through an analysis of each
prong—the cognitive and the volitional—in the most popular insanity tests
that have been adopted in the United States, namely the M’Naghten rule
and the American Law Institute (ALI) test. The purpose is not to conduct
an in-depth analysis of these insanity standards (the literature is already
overabundant), 32 but simply to highlight the main normative aspects that
will allow one to deduce the law’s acceptance of an intellectualistic
understanding of the capacity for moral rationality underlying the insanity
doctrine.
A. COGNITION AND THE COGNITIVE PRONG OF INSANITY TESTS

The strict relationship between capacity for moral rationality and
cognition can be easily grasped in the cognitive prong of insanity standards.
To illustrate this relationship, this section analyzes first the formulation of

30
Glanville Williams, The Criminal Responsibility of Children, CRIM. L. REV. 493, 494
(1954) (asserting that “the only persons capable of acting wrongly are those of a certain
intelligence or intellectual accomplishment”).
31
See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750 n.12 (2006) (listing state statutes); infra
Section I.A and Section I.B.
32
See generally Michelle Holtzman, Criminal Insanity – Another M’Naghten?, 23 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 644 (1969); American Bar Association, Insanity Defense, 16 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 27 (1992); JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, THE ROLE OF MENTAL
ILLNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE 2 (2001); Lisa A. Callahan et al., The
Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991); GERBEN MEYNEN, LEGAL INSANITY EXPLORATIONS IN
PSYCHIATRY, LAW AND ETHICS (2016); Susan Rozelle, Pure Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
543 (2009); Paul Robinson & Markus Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007); Norval Morris, Richard Bonnie & Joel Finer,
Should the Insanity Defense Be Abolished? An Introduction to the Debate, 1 J.L. & HEALTH
113 (1986–1987).
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the M’Naghten rule. 33 The test contained in it states that insanity exists
when the following conditions are met:
[A]t the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of [the] mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. 34

The cognitivism upon which the rule relies emerges from the
relationship among “disease of [the] mind,” “defect of reason,” and
“knowledge.” The concept of “reason” in the formulation of the
M’Naghten rule has not been fully explored by criminal law theorists, and
its meaning remains unclear. 35 According to Herbert Fingarette, however,
the expression “defect of reason” as it is used in M’Naghten clearly refers
to a defect in the capacity for (moral) rationality. 36 He argues that the
concept of rationality has, for the most part, fallen by the wayside during
debates on the insanity defense, since the M’Naghten test’s “defect of
reason” phrase “has not been understood.” 37 Fingarette holds that this is a
“profound mistake [because] the defect-of-reason clause tells us that ‘know
the nature and quality of the act’ and ‘know that is wrong’ must be taken to
apply with reference to the person’s . . . capacity for rational conduct.” 38
Accepting this interpretation of the defect of reason as defect of the
capacity for moral rationality, the intellectualistic substance of this clause
emerges primarily from the knowledge requirement. In this respect, Arval
Morris emphasizes the pivotal function of the word “know,” for it
“circumscribes the entire test by singling out one aspect of a human being’s
total personality, the cognitive one.” 39 Therefore, Morris continues, “the

33

The M’Naghten rule has been largely qualified as the product of rationalist
psychology in vogue at the time it was enacted. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Responsibility and
Proposed Revisions of the M’Naghten Rule, 32 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 247, 250 (1958)
(“M’Naghten, it is claimed, is a product of a rationalist era, acknowledging only the
cognitive or intellectual faculty and does not allow for the incapacity of the will or the
influence of the emotions.”); see also RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 30
(1984) (asserting that at the time of M’Naghten, “cognition was seen as the highest function
of the personality. Philosophers searching for the Cartesian dregs of the period expressed the
notion that the mind controlled bodily behavior like an angel driving a machine.”).
34
R. v. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
35
See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in THE HANDBOOK OF
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 299, 306 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011).
36
FINGARETTE, supra note 12, at 198 (“I believe that ‘a defect of reason’ from ‘disease
of the mind’ is to be read in paraphrase: ‘substantial defect in capacity for rational conduct’
as ‘an endogenous (pathological) condition of mind.’”).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Arval A. Morris, Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REV. 583, 605 (1968).
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test is heavily intellectualistic, and from a psychological point of view,
narrow because the cognitive becomes the single, important criterion of
criminal responsibility.” 40 Likewise, Rudolph Gerber critically observes
that the term “knowledge” traditionally refers to a verbal or purely
intellectual assent to a moral proposition. 41 The word “know” can therefore
be interpreted as an appreciation of “the significance of cognitive
observation, that is, whether the defendant is able to relate what is known to
the situation at hand and to govern conduct accordingly.” 42 In this sense,
the verb “to know” indicates one’s capacity to be aware of and correctly
understand certain objective features of behavior. What is more, as Raider
notes, courts tend not to define the verb “to know,” and therefore its
interpretation is left largely to juries’ discretionary common sense. 43
The knowledge requirement circumscribes the meaning of the “disease
of the mind” clause to encompass only cognitive diseases. As has been
observed, courts vary on how they define “disease of [the] mind.” 44 Hence,
a finding of such disease “follows almost automatically” 45 when it is found
that a defendant was in such a state that he or she did not know the factual
and moral implications of his or her conduct. 46 However, an explicit
interpretation of the substance of the “disease of the mind” requirement can
be found in R v. Kemp, 47 a case that was heard at the Bristol Assizes in
1957. Commenting on the relationship between the “defect of reason” and
“disease of the mind” requirements, Justice Devlin wrote that “[t]he law is
not concerned with the brain but with the mind, in the sense that ‘mind’ is

40

Id.
Rudolph Joseph Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. JUR. 111, 120 (1975).
42
RICHARD BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF JOHN
HINCKLEY, JR. 12 (3d ed. 2008); see also ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 49–
50 (1967).
43
Laura Raider, Toward a New Test for Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries
of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, 306 (1998); see also
James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making,
15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 526 (1991); NORMAN FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’
NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995).
44
JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE, AND
TESTIMONY 336 (2009) (“Under M’Naghten, there must be a ‘disease of the mind.’ This term
has been interpreted very differently over the years. In its broadest meaning, ‘any
diagnosable mental disorder’ is sufficient, while under the more narrow interpretation a
‘severe impairment, usually in the form of psychosis,’ is required.”).
45
Richard H. Kuh, The Insanity Defense—An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 771, 785 (1962).
46
Id.
47
1 QB 399 (1957). For a comment, see J.E. Hall Williams, Defect of Reason from
Disease of the Mind, 20 MOD. L. REV. 55, 56 (1957).
41
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ordinarily used, the mental faculties of reason, memory and
understanding.” 48
This interpretation of the “disease of mind” requirement is pivotal
because it underlines the equation of the (legally relevant) mind with
cognitive faculties. 49 Hence, because the rule states that the defect of
reason (i.e., moral rationality) must derive from a disease of the mind, it
implicitly assumes that the only mental source of the capacity for moral
rationality is cognition. Consequently, only purely cognitive defects are
considered capable of giving rise to irrational behavior. As Gerber more
precisely describes it, it is only “when cognition is defective the personality
as a whole is so impaired that the accused cannot ‘know’ the wrongfulness
of his actions.” 50 Thus, a legally relevant disease of the mind cannot but be
a cognitive disease, such as pure psychosis.
The test contained in the M’Naghten rule has given rise to several
controversies over the years. On the one hand, some specialists in criminal
law have been staunch defenders of the test and maintained that it is
fundamental to the notions of moral blame and retribution. 51 On the other
hand, mental health specialists, supported by some legal scholars and
practitioners, have held that the M’Naghten test is obsolete and
unscientific 52 and “not only bad science but unsound law.” 53 Critics
holding this view have relied upon the fact that cognitive or intellectual
integrity is not sufficient to account for a person’s knowledge of the
wrongfulness of the act he or she is about to perform and the ability to
control himself or herself. 54 In other words, the intellectual test contained
in the rule is too narrow to encompass the entire scope of legal insanity.
48

R v. Kemp, 1 QB at 399 (emphasis added).
See FINGARETTE, supra note 12, at 144 (“[T]he M’Naghten test deals with only one of
the mind’s three ‘functions,’ the cognitive function.”).
50
Gerber, supra note 41, at 119.
51
See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules,
42 A.B.A. J. 917 (1956).
52
See Simon E. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From M’Naghten to Durham,
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A. J. 793, 877 (1955) (“The M’Naghten rule requires medical witnesses
to testify in terms that to them are artificial and confining . . . When [a doctor] is forced to
adopt the vocabulary of morality and ethics, he is speaking in what to him is a foreign
language . . . .”).
53
Kuh, supra note 45, at 782.
54
See, e.g., Carl Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and
Wrong, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 30, 43 (1959) (“The emphasis upon knowledge as the test of
responsibility is indicative of what is perhaps the underlying misconception of the
McNaghten rule—that the cognitive capacities can be singled out, among mental
phenomena, as the proper determinants of sanity and responsibility. Although we do, for
purposes of analysis, distinguish the cognitive, conative, and affective aspects of mental life,
49
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To fill the gaps and shortcomings of the M’Naghten rule, in 1962 the
ALI introduced a new insanity standard in the MPC. 55 The MPC’s
formulation is based on the assumption that insanity should be grounded in
a broader understanding of cognition, and a reference to volitional
incapacity should be included explicitly in the formulation of the defense.56
The broadening of the cognitive prong of legal insanity has resulted in the
dismissal of the verb “to know” and the simultaneous adoption of the
broader verb “to appreciate.” 57 This term has, however, caused interpretive
confusion because it is unclear how broadly it should be understood. 58
According to some authors, the term “appreciate” has been introduced to
allow the inclusion of the emotional capacity to perceive the wrongfulness
of one’s conduct. 59 Others have held that this broader understanding of the
verb “to appreciate” is merely ostensible, and that it still refers to a purely
cognitive capacity to propositionally understand the meaning of one’s
conduct. 60
This stricter cognition-based interpretation is confirmed by the socalled “caveat paragraph” of the test, which explicitly rules out “any
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial

it is an error to assume, as the McNaghten rule does, that these aspects of experience can be
separated to the extent that one alone—the cognitive—is the index of mental health. The
actual mental experience of persons, well or sick, cannot be broken up so neatly into its
constituents. We can no longer assume that reason, or cognition, is the only—or even the
prime—regulator of conduct. That the human personality is an integrated unity, in the
direction of which all of the modes of experience play some part is now a commonplace.
The point is that people may be brought, by insane emotion or compulsion, to do what they
themselves know to be wrong. Yet that faculty psychology already discussed, so prevalent in
the nineteenth century, has colored, through the McNaghten opinions, the legal standards of
the present day.”).
55
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
56
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
57
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”).
58
See Kuh, supra note 45, at 797–98 (asserting that the words ‘substantial’ and
‘appreciate’ “were intentionally chosen for their imprecision”).
59
RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 37–39 (1988).
60
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 88. Also, the cognitive nature of the verb “to
appreciate” emerges from the explanatory notes of Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code:
“An individual’s failure to appreciate the criminality of his conduct may consist in a lack of
awareness of what he is doing or a misapprehension of material circumstances, or a failure to
apprehend the significance of his actions in some deeper sense.” THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, PART I.
GENERAL PROVISIONS 62 (1985).
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conduct from the notion of mental disease or defect.” 61 The reference, as
has been claimed, is to those categories of subjects with impaired emotional
faculties and marked tendencies to engage in antisocial conduct, such as in
the case of psychopaths. 62
B. COGNITION AND THE VOLITIONAL PRONG OF INSANITY TESTS

The volitional prong of insanity standards is surely more controversial
than the cognitive one. As noted above, volition essentially means free
exercise of choice among conflicting courses of action, with distinct sets of
reasons. 63 In substantial capacity doctrines, such as insanity, volition
fundamentally equates to the capacity for self-control. 64 Unlike the
cognitive prong, however, the volitional prong of insanity standards is both
conceptually and epistemologically troublesome.
Conceptually, it is not clear what the capacity or incapacity for selfcontrol actually means, nor is there a unanimous consensus about it among
philosophers, legal scholars, and legal practitioners. Unlike cognitive
capacity or incapacity, volitional capacity or incapacity results in a
doubling of a person’s personality, meaning that normality and abnormality
coexist in the same person, between which it is incredibly difficult to
conceptualize a dividing line. 65 In other words, it is not clear when a
person cannot resist an impulse or simply will not resist an impulse. As a
consequence, from an epistemological perspective, the major reasons for
the skepticism surrounding the issue of whether lack of self-control should
be taken into account as an autonomous prong of insanity range from
difficulty in assessing and quantifying self-control, to practical difficulty in
differentiating lack of self-control from poorly planned or impulsive acts. 66
Based on these limitations, many scholars, and the law itself, endorse
the view that the capacity for self-control ultimately depends on the
cognitive faculties of knowledge or understanding. 67 In other words, if the
61

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
See RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 197 (2d ed. 2009).
63
See supra notes 23–24.
64
See supra note 24.
65
A remarkable attempt has been made by Michael Moore, who has provided a folkpsychological account of volitional capacity and excuse. See Michael S. Moore, The
Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 179 (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo eds., 2016).
66
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 216 (3d ed. 2007).
67
See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility - M’Naghten
Versus Durham and the American Law Institute’s Tentative Draft, 33 IND. L.J. 212, 213–14
(1958) (“The second point that I think we must hold on to is the relationship between
62
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capacity for moral rationality means the ability to determine (i.e., know, be
aware of, understand, and so forth) the factual, social, and moral value of a
given action, it simultaneously consists of the ability “not to act [and, thus,
to exert self-control] if doing so is known to be wrong.” 68 Thus, by
presuming that the capacity for self-control depends on people’s prior
knowledge of the factual and moral significance of their actions, criminal
law implicitly accepts that the source of self-control lies in cognitive
faculties. 69
The view of self-control as a faculty depending on knowledge—which
is expressed in the ancient legal maxim nihil volitum nisi praecognitum
(nothing is desired unless it is first known)—is manifest in the history of
insanity standards. To begin, the M’Naghten test includes only a cognitive
prong in that it roots the grounds for insanity in the possession of the
cognitive capacity to know the nature and quality of one’s act and that the
act is wrong. 70 As Gerber observes, “The [M’Naghten] rule assumes that if
an individual ‘knows’ right from wrong, his rational powers are intact and
that he is, therefore, capable of governing his conduct.” 71 Similarly, Snyder
claims that “an offender who knows what he does, knows that it is
wrong . . . and coolly and carefully prepares what he does, can and does
control his action right up to the moment of commission.” 72 Thus, although
a volitional prong is not explicitly provided, it is implicitly derived from the
cognitive one.
intelligence and the control of conduct. If we look about us and visualize the magnificent
structures of science and legal systems and ethics, we attribute these great achievements to
man’s capacity for thought, to human understanding. Can we then allow psychiatrists or any
other specialists to persuade us that human understanding has no effective relationship to the
commission of the serious harms that are the concern of criminal law? It seems to me that
we should ask for evidence and a great deal of evidence before we accept the irrationalism
that one’s reason may be unimpaired and that nonetheless it exercises no control over such
conduct.”).
68
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 167 (2d ed. 1960). To put it
into an example: if A knows that shooting B will kill B, and A knows that the act of killing
is wrong, then A is supposed to refrain from shooting B because of this
knowledge/awareness, both factual and normative.
69
To put it into an example: A is intelligent, A’s intelligence enables him to know what
stabbing B means, and therefore A willfully chooses to stab, or prevents himself from
stabbing B, based on this knowledge.
70
R. v. M’Naghten 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
71
GERBER, supra note 33, at 30.
72
Orvill C. Snyder, Criminal Responsibility, 1962 DUKE L.J. 204, 209 (1962); see also
Kuh, supra note 45, at 782 (“As man is an ‘integrated personality,’ his knowledge, his will,
and his ability to act are all intertwined. The word ‘know,’ as used in McNaughton, can be
taken to mean not only the ability to perceive by use of the senses and intellect, but the
ability to guide or control one’s action in the light of this perception.”).
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As has also been noted, the M’Naghten rule has been harshly criticized
by scholars and practitioners of criminal law who have emphasized the
extreme narrowness of the sole cognitive test.73 These critiques have led
some United States jurisdictions, in an effort to counter the excessive
restrictiveness of the M’Naghten rule, to adopt the “irresistible impulse
test” 74—today abandoned—and, many years later, the ALI test. 75 Focusing
solely on the latter, the ALI standard defines the capacity for self-control as
“the capacity to conform behavior to what the law requires.” 76 Under this
new definition, lack of self-control occurs when individuals cannot (or find
it impossibly difficult) act as the law requires, regardless of whether or not
they know they should behave as the law prescribes.
Despite its initial popularity, today only a few states continue to apply
the ALI test. 77 Public outcry 78 after the verdict in United States v.
Hinckley 79 led to subsequent legislation that narrowed the insanity defense
by removing the volitional defense theory. 80 In 1983, the American
Psychiatric Association released a statement arguing that volitional tests
may be unnecessary because defendants who meet the exculpatory criteria
set forth in volitional tests will usually meet the exculpatory criteria for
cognitive impairment tests as well.81 In the wake of that statement, as of
73

See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
See Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897); Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854,
866–67 (Ala. 1877); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844).
75
MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
76
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
77
See American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, AAPL Practice Guideline for
Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. S3, S66 (2014).
78
The Associated Press, Hinckley Acquittal Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1982, at D21.
79
525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
80
CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL: GREAT CASES IN
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 99 (2006) (“[F]ederal and state legislators were busy revising or
abolishing insanity laws in an effort to make sure that another Hinckley verdict would never
occur.”).
81
American Psychiatric Association, Statement on Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983) (“The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not
resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk . . . . The concept of
volition is the subject of some disagreement among psychiatrists. Many psychiatrists
therefore believe that psychiatric testimony (particularly that of a conclusory nature) about
volition is more likely to produce confusion for jurors than is psychiatric testimony relevant
to a defendant’s appreciation or understanding.”). However, the APA retired this position in
2008. See Donna Norris, Reports to Membership, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1214, 1214 (2008)
(“The sixth position statement, Insanity Defense, replaced the statement approved in 1982
and updated it with a more concise and up-to-date formulation. This more concise position
74
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1984 the ALI test was largely discarded in favor of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act (IDRA): 82 the first federal codification of the insanity defense
that was introduced with the explicit purpose of removing the volitional
component from the ALI standard.
Today, a minor number of US jurisdictions employ the “control”
test. 83 The majority of them remain mired in a view that the only viable
basis for a plea of insanity is a mental disease or disorder that has led to
cognitive impairment resulting in an incapacity to know, understand, or
appreciate the factual, moral, social, or even legal significance of one’s
conduct. 84 Lack of self-control is assessed indirectly as a possible further
Therefore, if individuals are
consequence of cognitive defects.85
cognitively able to know right from wrong and their rational powers are

statement is aimed at underscoring APA support for a meaningful insanity defense without
endorsing any particular standard.”).
82
18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984) (“Affirmative defense: It is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution under any Federal Statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.”); see Stephen J. Morse, Insanity Defense
Reform Act (IDRA), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 374 (Brian L. Cutler ed.,
2008).
83
See Paul H. Robinson & Tyler Scott Williams, Mapping American Criminal Law:
Variations Across the 50 States - Ch. 14 Insanity Defense, U. PA. FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP
1718 (2017) [http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1718].
84
Id.
85
See Paul Litton, Is Psychological Research on Self-Control Relevant to Criminal
Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 725, 730–31 (2014) (commenting on the relationship between
the psychological conception of self-control and the understanding of self-control that is
implicit in cognitive tests, he observes that “[a]n agent has the requisite control over her
conduct, and is thus sane, if she has the capacity to understand the nature and moral quality
of her conduct.” Using the famous example of Andrea Yates—who, while suffering from
psychotic delusions, killed her five children—he observes that “[if we] stipulate that Yates
had a very strong desire not to kill her children and that she fought against this desire
because she believed that the morally best action was to kill her children . . . then Yates
would have exercised self-control; however, she could still be judged insane under
M’Naghten if she did not know her acts were wrong. The conception of control implicit in
cognitive insanity standards is distinct from the kind of self-control under [psychological]
study.”). See also Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005); for comments on Yates
case and the relationship between cognitive and volitional prongs, see generally Brian D.
Shannon, The Time is Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense: An Essay, 39 TEXAS TECH.
L. REV. 67 (2006); Christine Michalopoulos, Note, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity
Defense: The Andrea Yates Case and the Need for a Volitional Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 383 (2003); Melinda Carrido, Revisiting the Insanity Defense: A Case for Resurrecting
the Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense in Light of Neuroscientific Advances, 41 SW. L.
REV. 309, 322–23 (2012).
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intact, then it follows that they are capable of controlling their own conduct.
Altogether, they do not meet the criteria to be eligible for legal insanity.
II. THE NEGLIGIBLE ROLE OF EMOTIONS
Criminal law’s adherence to a cognitivist model of legal insanity finds
further support in the lack of consideration of emotions within the essential
components of the capacity for moral rationality—and hence of
culpability. 86 While there is a long-standing dispute among scholars from
different disciplines about the exact meaning of emotion, 87 this Article
addresses an understanding of emotion adopted by criminal law. The
answer is intuitive. Criminal law’s view of emotion is rationalist and folk
psychological. 88 Under the folk—and rationalist—conception, emotions
mostly take on negative connotations, in that they are viewed as contrasting
with intellect, and therefore may only undermine rational moral behavior. 89
Simply put, in criminal law “emotions are thought to be irrational,
involuntary, and animal-like, whereas . . . intellect is rational, voluntary,
and distinctly human.” 90

86

As has been discussed, the legal understanding of the capacity for moral rationality is
essentially based on the fusion of cognition and volition. See supra Part I.
87
See, e.g., Klaus R. Schrerer, What Are Emotions? How Can They Be Measured?, 44
SOC. SCI. 695, 696 (2005) (“The concept of ‘emotion’ presents a particularly thorny
problem. Even though the term is used very frequently, to the point of being extremely
fashionable these days, the question ‘What is an emotion?’ rarely generates the same answer
from different individuals, scientists or laymen alike.”); see also Ronald deSousa, Emotion,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/
[https://perma.cc/RVX9-RJXL] (illustrating the different views about the functions and the
ontology of emotions); John Deigh, Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and
Psychology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION 17 (2009) (illustrating
the different conceptions of emotions either as affective states or as cognitive states); Paul
Kleinginna & Anne M. Kleinginna, A Categorized List Of Emotion Definitions, With
Suggestions For a Consensual Definition, 5 MOTIV. EMOT. 345 (1981).
88
Folk psychology can be defined as the natural tendency human beings have to express
and describe the behavior of others on the basis of the possessing mental states (intentions,
desires, beliefs, etc), by using common linguistic terms. Criminal law heavily embodies folk
psychological accounts of human behavior. See, e.g., Katrina Sifferd, Translating
Neuroscientific Evidence into the Language of the “Folk,” in NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITY 183, 191 (Nicole Vincent ed., 2010) (explaining that “criminal law grounds
the assessment of responsibility on behavioral evidence, and behavioral evidence is likely to
directly trigger attribution of mental states required by the legal criteria for guilt or not
guilt.”).
89
Commonplace idioms reveal this bias: “Keep a cool head;” “Keep your emotions at
bay;” or “Do not let your passions interfere with your reason.”
90
NORMAN FINKEL & GERROD PARROT, EMOTIONS AND CULPABILITY: HOW THE LAW IS
AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF 53 (2006).
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This rationalist and commonsense-based understanding of emotions
adopted by criminal law is what Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum call the
Under the mechanistic
“mechanistic conception” 91 of emotions.
conception, emotions have a negative effect on reasoning and self-control, 92
as they are forces that do not contain or respond to thought. 93 As such,
emotions are not part of the mental states that comprise moral rationality
and do not play any positive role within morally rational decision-making.
Rather, emotions are treated as irrational occurrences that may distort moral
reasoning and potentially destabilize moral decision-making by preventing
people from selecting the adequate means to achieve their goals, therefore
negatively affecting their self-control. 94
While embracing this perspective, criminal law excludes the emotional
dimension of the mind from having any significant relevance for the mental
preconditions of culpability. As Norman Finkel and Gerrod Parrot note,
“[t]he folk category of emotion can appear to threaten the orderly rule of
law, for it carries with it the irrationality of primate impulses and the
indeterminacy of subjective states. These perceived threats account for
why the Law omits emotion in favor of more cognitive criteria. . . .” 95 Also,
as the two authors suggest, the general reluctance to properly address
emotion is linked to the law’s effort to avoid subjective rules, standards,

91

See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275–95 (1996).
92
See id. at 273.
93
Id. at 278–79 (“[E]motions . . . are energies that impel the person to action, without
embodying ways of thinking about or perceiving objects or situations in the world . . . .
Emotions feel like things that sweep over us, or sweep us away, or invade us often without
our consent or control . . . .”).
94
The other conception of emotion is the evaluative conception. See Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 91, at 273 (explaining that under the evaluative conception “emotions
express cognitive appraisals, that these appraisals can be morally evaluated, and that persons
can and should shape their emotions through moral education”). Kahan and Nussbaum
actually defend an idea that even though the law’s language may suggest a view of emotions
that is distinctively primitive, bodily, and mechanical, its logic actually suggests an
evaluative understanding of emotions. Speaking about rage, the two authors maintain that
rage is mitigating not because of a mechanical loss of control but because rage expresses
values that are proper in the situation. In other words, it is conceivable that the law expresses
understanding of emotion’s cognitive aspects, even if it draws on non-cognitive metaphors
to describe it. I disagree with this view. While the premises of Kahan’s and Nussbaum’s
reasoning are logical and certainly correct (emotions are evaluative and cognitive, and
should be considered as such by the law), I am not inclined to think that criminal law
actually takes the evaluative perspective into account. As it emerges from normative texts
and their dominant interpretations, the view that emotions are in opposition to cognition and
self-control is manifest.
95
See FINKEL & PARROT, supra note 90, at 48.
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and judgments as much as possible. 96 Therefore, the law opts for “more
mechanical, physical, bodily aspects of everyday emotion language.” 97
Despite criminal law’s firmness in denying emotion a positive role in a
person’s capacity for moral rationality, some commentators do recognize
that the presence or absence of emotional capacities or states should be
weighed in the evaluation of the substantial capacities necessary for
responsibility. 98 However, as Raider notes, “although some of these
theorists acknowledge a richer conception of rationality than pure
instrumental reasoning, including a limited role of emotions, they stop short
of including all of the relevant capacities.” 99 Indeed, even when emotions
are thought of as relevant components, they are still treated as a quid pluris
and still on a distinct and minor level to that of cognition and rationality. 100
The neglected positive role of emotion in moral rationality is manifest
in culpability doctrines and particularly in the insanity doctrine. The
absence of emotions from the substance of legal insanity emerges from a
twofold position: 1) no insanity standard provides for an emotional capacity
test, that is, a test measuring a defendant’s capacity to emotionally
appreciate the moral significance of his or her action; and 2) insanity
standards infer volitional incapacity only from cognitive impairments, not
emotional ones: emotional disturbance affecting self-control is considered
only in diminished-capacity doctrines.
A. “MORAL INSANITY” AND THE LACK OF AN EMOTIONAL CAPACITY
TEST

In 1835, the Bristolian physician Dr. James Cowles Prichard described
moral insanity as “a form of mental derangement, a morbid perversion of
the feelings, affections, and active powers without any illusion or erroneous
conviction impressed upon the understanding: it sometimes co-exists with
an apparently unimpaired state of intellectual faculties.” 101 Prichard’s
96

Id. at 83.
Id.
98
See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 614–
15 (1997); Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 543 (1996); Peter
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between Legal
and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992).
99
Raider, supra note 43, at 293.
100
For example, Stephen Morse qualifies emotions as one of the protective variables
that also might help the agent to be in control. Yet, Morse places them on a distinct and
independent level compared to rationality. See Morse, supra note 24, at 1607–08.
101
JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS
AFFECTING THE MIND 20 (1835). Also, Cesare Lombroso adhered to Prichard’s theory of
moral insanity to complete his theory of the criminal man. Moral insanity, along with
97
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description presents a view of people suffering from moral insanity as being
impaired in their inclinations, tempers, habits, moral dispositions and
natural impulses, but without any remarkable disorder or defect of the
intellect or reasoning faculties, and particularly without any illusion or
hallucination. 102
Presently, the concept of moral insanity has become synonymous with
socio-affective disorders, such as antisocial personality disorder (ASPD),
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) and, above all, psychopathy. 103
Although appearing in different forms, these disorders share emotional
deficits and an increased disregard for other individuals which can be
expressed through a tendency to engage in violent and aggressive
conduct. 104 People suffering from these disorders do not exhibit any
significant deficit in the cognitive functions of knowledge and
understanding. 105 Psychopathy represents the most emblematic example.
Although there is a growing consensus that psychopathy should be classed
as a mental disorder, criminal law treats psychopaths as paradigmatic
culpable agents. 106 The reason is simple: psychopaths’ intellectual faculties
atavism and epilepsy, forms a universal trait of criminal subjects. See CESARE LOMBROSO,
CRIMINAL MAN 188 ([3d ed. 1884] transl. by Mary Gibson & Nicole Hahn Rafter, 2006).
102
PRICHARD id. at 16.
103
According to the nosographic description contained in the DSM-5, Antisocial
Personality Disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of
other people, which often manifests as hostility, aggression, or both. Deceit and
manipulation are also central features. People with Narcissistic Personality Disorder have
significant problems with their sense of self-worth stemming from a powerful sense of
entitlement. This leads them to believe that they deserve special treatment and to assume that
they have special powers, are uniquely talented, or are especially brilliant or attractive. Their
sense of entitlement can lead them to act in ways that fundamentally disregard and disrespect
the worth of those around them. Psychopathy, on the other hand, is a mental disorder
featured by marked emotional dysfunctions, limited capacity for moral judgments, and
recidivistic offending. Psychopathy is not officially recognized as a personality disorder. It is
not even included in the DSM-5, nor is there a unanimous opinion among psychiatrists and
psychologists as to whether psychopathy should be qualified as a disorder at all. Attempts to
define psychopathy as an autonomous kind of disorder and provide specific items to identify
it have been made primarily by Dr. Robert Hare, who authored the Psychopathy Checklist
Revised in 1990. As described in the checklist, psychopathy encompasses traits typical to
both ASPD (e.g., lack of impulse control) and NPD (e.g., grandiose sense of self-worth). See
Robert Hare et al., The Revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and Factor Structure, 2
PSYCHOL. ASSESS.: J. CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 338, 339 (Table 1) (1990).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 8 NEUROETHICS
205, 207 (2008) (“The law does not excuse psychopaths, even those whose psychopathy is
clear and severe. Psychopathy is not a legally sufficient basis to raise an insanity defense or
any other excuse.”).

26

COPPOLA

[Vol. 109

are substantially intact; psychopaths are intelligent enough to know the
facts, have no misperception of reality, and understand that there are rules
and consequences for violating them. 107 What they lack is “simply”
empathy, regret, guilt, or more generally, prosocial emotions and
Even if psychopaths display significant emotional
feelings. 108
abnormalities, they are never legally excused for their criminal actions. 109
Rather, their condition may even lead to harsher sentences.110
The first and fundamental reason for excluding subjects suffering from
severe socio-affective deficits—such as psychopathy—from the range of
eligible candidates for the insanity defense lies in the law’s limited regard
of emotional faculties within the evaluation of the capacity for moral
rationality. 111 As such, deficits in the emotional faculties—however
pathological—are not considered to sufficiently affect an individual’s
capacity for moral rationality. 112 As long as individuals possess intact
intellectual faculties, and thus demonstrate substantive instrumental
reasoning faculties and competent use of them, a possible deficiency in
emotional faculties does not affect their culpability. 113 Quite the contrary,
these characteristics appear to symptomize an intense form of “evil” which
deserves even harsher punishment. 114
The second, and consequential, reason for excluding socio-affective
deficits from the host of conditions eligible for the insanity defense is that
they—however pathological—do not meet traditional insanity standards,
which admit no relevance for emotional capacities. While standards such
as the M’Naghten rule do not consider emotional capacity at all, the MPC
seems to admit the lack of emotional capacity has some relevance.115 As
noted above, however, this acceptance is ostensible.116
107

Id. at 208.
See Hare, supra note 103.
109
See Morse, supra note 106, at 208.
110
Id. at 207–08.
111
See supra Part II.
112
See supra Part II.
113
See supra Part II.
114
See, e.g., John F. Edens et al., Psychopathy and the Death Penalty: Can the
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Identify Offenders Who Represent ‘A Continuing Threat to
Society’?, 29 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 458–63 (2001); Stephen D. Hart, Psychopathy,
Culpability, and Commitment, in MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 159, 168–69
(Robert F. Schopp et al. eds., 2009); Christina Lee, Judicial Response to Psychopathic
Criminals: Utilitarianism over Retribution, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 125, 127–32 (2007).
115
See HALL supra note 68, at 169 (“The use of ‘appreciate’ rather than ‘know’ conveys
a broader sense of understanding than simple cognition.”).
116
See PARRY, supra note 44, at 311 (observing that “while the notion of appreciation of
criminal conduct is distinguishable from the more narrow [sic] conception of knowing right
108
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These claims find further confirmation in the second paragraph of the
MPC test (the “caveat paragraph”), specifying that the notion of mental
disease or defect does not include repeated manifestations of criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct. 117 As previously noted, this provision was
introduced with the explicit purpose of excluding psychopaths and, more
broadly, patients suffering from socio-affective disorders from the range of
eligible candidates for insanity defense. 118 As Schopp observes:
Th[e] requirement [of emotional awareness] . . . would seem to exculpate the cold
or vicious criminal who victimizes innocent people without experiencing
sympathy or remorse. Yet, the insanity defense certainly is not intended to
exculpate such criminals. Rather, these are just the people that the criminal law—
and the prison system—are designed to deter. 119

As can be noted, the rationale for excluding emotionally deficient
perpetrators also lies in safeguarding public safety needs. Extreme forms of
moral deviancy are considered symptomatic only of particularly dangerous
personalities: the kinds that are very likely to harm society repeatedly. 120
There is consequently a tendency—in criminal law as well as in common
understanding—to qualify patients suffering from pathological socioaffective deficits as iconic wrongdoers, as “evil” individuals who constantly
and willingly reject and break the rules of societal coexistence. 121 As such,

from wrong contemplated by the M’Naughten rule, the ALI model still emphasizes the
offenders’ cognition of the criminality of their acts. In practice, the ALI model continues to
rely upon instrumental reasoning capacities”).
117
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“As used in this Article, the
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.”)
118
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962); see also SLOVENKO, supra
note 62.
119
ROBERT SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1991).
120
See Edens, supra note 114.
121
See. e.g., Maria Isabel Gonzalez-Tapia et al., A New Legal Treatment for
Psychopaths? Perplexities for Legal Thinkers, 54 INT. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 46, 47 (2017)
(“Psychopathy . . . represents archetypes of ‘evil’, of incorrigible criminals, for whom a
retributive culpability-based punishment is not enough and a consequentialist
‘dangerousness-based’ legal response would be required.”); William Waller, “Criminal”
Insanity & Public Morality, 4 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 183, 190–91 (2011) (observing that
sociopaths [meaning people suffering from antisocial personality disorder] are not good
candidates for the insanity defense, even if on the literal terms of a majority of permutations
it ought to apply. Apart from self-selection, sociopaths can be handled routinely under the
criminal law because their mental illness is, diagnostically speaking, behavioral . . . Because
the defense serves to control retribution . . . society has enough reservation with applying the
defense outside of situations where the accused possesses certain overt, graphic,
physiological characteristics. Faced with a disorder defined only in terms of a tendency

28

COPPOLA

[Vol. 109

they fully deserve blame and punishment, as well as the kind of criminal
incapacitation that curbs their antisocial tendencies while keeping society
safe.
B. LACK OF SELF-CONTROL AND EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

As discussed above, criminal law is mostly insensitive to whether a
defendant is in control at the time of the crime, unless this lack of control is
the result of a mental disease affecting his or her cognitive faculties of
knowledge and understanding. Conversely, the legal relevance of an
incapacity for self-control that is linked to emotional impairments does not
suffice for exculpation. While criminal law accepts that emotions may
overturn reason and control, emotions do not do so to the point of providing
grounds for insanity and blamelessness.
This view has its foundations in the folk-legal conception that
emotions are not essential for moral rationality. 122 Rather, emotions are
mental states that can and should be defeated by rational powers.123 As
phrased by Finkel and Parrott, “in the Law’s folk psychology theory as well
as in its normative expectations, there is the belief that control over one’s
emotions is psychologically possible and normatively expected.” 124 Thus,
although criminal law treats emotions as mental states that may override
reason and self-control, if a defendant acts under strong emotional
influence—however pathological in nature—this condition is not treated as
the kind of moral rationality defect that might exculpate him or her.
While lack of self-control due to emotional impairments cannot
ground a total excuse, there are a few cases in which criminal law allows
for mitigation due to lack of self-control resulting from an emotional
breakdown. Among them, the most emblematic are the mitigating
conditions in common law’s “heat of passion” 125 and the MPC’s EED
defenses. 126 Both mitigations constitute specific forms of diminished
toward antisocial behavior, however, and of which sufferers are sensationalized as evil,
society will revert to its baseline of the criminal sanction . . . .”).
122
See supra Section II.
123
See supra Section II.
124
See FINKEL & PARROT, supra note 90, at 137.
125
See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as
Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 29–30 (2009) (observing that under
the Provocation/ Passion partial excuse, “the defendant must demonstrate that (a) he was
adequately provoked, (b) as a direct result of said provocation, he became emotionally
charged such that he lost self-control, (c) not enough time to ‘cool off’ passed between
provocation and killing, and (d) he did not, in fact, cool off prior to killing his victim(s)”).
126
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962). The EED is a codified
and expanded version of the Heat of Passion doctrine which—despite its greater
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capacity 127 that bring substantially lower penalties. It is important to
outline that such mitigation is only available for reducing murder to
manslaughter and not for any other crime. 128 Thus, if a person commits any
crime other than homicide in a state of emotional disturbance, he or she is
not able to raise this kind of defense at the trial stage to obtain a reduction
of penalty. 129
Both the EED and the heat of passion doctrines are based on the
commonsense-based intuition that persons in extreme emotional conditions
generally do not intend and cannot control very much of anything. 130 That
is, when there is strong emotion there cannot be deliberation. Based on this
intuition, the law at least grants mitigation by recognizing that people who
kill while in a state of extremely heightened emotion—with or without prior

narrowness—still remains the most largely mitigating doctrine adopted by U.S. jurisdictions.
Like the heat of passion standard, the EED standard allows that murder be reduced to
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant, due to an extreme emotional breakdown, acted in
an uncontrollable rage. Unlike heat of passion, however, the core component of the
mitigation is that the killing must have been committed “under the influence of an extreme
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation and excuse,” regardless of
whether the defendant was provoked or not. Therefore, “any affective experience sufficient
to disable a person’s ‘usual intellectual controls’ or scrambles ‘normal rational thinking’
counts as an extreme emotional disturbance”. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206
(1977); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E. 2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).
127
See Paul Robinson, Abnormal Mental State Mitigations of Murder – The U.S.
Perspective, in LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC,
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 291 (Alan Reed & Michael Bohlander eds.,
2011) (claiming that this mitigation is actually misleadingly referred to as diminished
capacity or partial responsibility, in that it only negates the existence of an element of the
crime but does not indicate reduced culpability or responsibility).
128
Uri Moaz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About Criminal
Responsibility?, 3 J. L. & BIOSCIENCE 120, 136 (2016) (asserting that the reason why the law
makes the EED mitigation available only for homicide lies in the fact that homicide is “a far
less common crime than many others. This indicates the rather stingy attitude in the law
towards basing differences in treatment on differences in control.”).
129
Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM L. 289, 296 (2003) (“Why should these doctrines be limited to homicide? For example,
suppose a defendant acting in the heat of passion intentionally burns the provoker’s property,
rather than killing the provoker. Or suppose that an agent suffering from a non-culpable state
of substantially diminished rationality commits arson. Some arsonists and some criminals
generally might act with non-culpable, substantially impaired rationality that does not meet
the standards for a full legal excuse. Compromised rationality and its effect on culpability
are not limited to homicide. Fairness and proportionality require that doctrinal mitigation
should be available in all cases in which culpability is substantially reduced.”).
130
See Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense? Some Reflections on a
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 959 n.5 (2002) (“Provocation law is all about
emotions.”).
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provocation, depending on the standard—are less than fully in control of
what they are doing.
An analysis of the doctrine of diminished capacity demonstrates an
unequal treatment of lack of self-control due to emotional impairments, as
compared to treatment of lack of control linked to cognitive defects. 131 In
line with this Article’s thesis, the reason for this disparity is that cognition
is considered to be the only essential source of moral rationality. Therefore,
when cognitive faculties are impaired, a person can lose the capacity to
control himself or herself and might be excused. Emotion, however, is
viewed as the opposite of intellect and is thus not constitutive of the mental
makeup of moral rationality. It follows that when there is no proof of a
cognitive or intellectual defect, there is no space for a volitional excuse on
the basis of emotional impairment alone. In the absence of a cognitive or
intellectual defect, emotional impairment is simply not enough to satisfy the
law.
III. EMOTIONS, MORALITY, AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INSIGHTS FROM
NEUROSCIENCE
As illustrated previously, criminal law tends to deny emotions a
positive role within the capacities for moral rationality that an individual
must possess in order to be potentially criminally culpable. While the
notion of culpability, and hence of culpability-related doctrines such as
insanity, revolve around the sphere of cognition, emotions are mostly
treated as sudden occurrences that can provoke a temporary distortion in an
individual’s capacity for practical moral reasoning. 132 Unlike cognitive
dysfunctions, emotional impairments are not treated as symptomatic of
moral rationality defects. 133 Thus, emotional faculties receive no
prominence in the substance of legal insanity.
The following sub-sections highlight that the legal overreliance on the
sphere of cognition, as well as the marked disregard of emotions in the
capacity for moral rationality, are empirically inaccurate. They do so by
measuring the legal paradigm of the capacity for moral rationality against
the neuroscientific (and behavioral) literature about the brain and the mental
dynamics that underpin moral judgment and decision-making, and
antisocial behavior. The aim here is not to conduct an exhaustive literature
review of this body of neuroscientific studies. Rather, and more narrowly,
it is to use relevant scientific literature to highlight the foremost mistaken
131
132
133

See discussion supra Section I.B.
See discussion supra Section II.
Id.
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legal-psychological assumptions emerging from the legal understanding of
the capacity for moral rationality and, consequently, from insanity tests.
First, “emotion” is as critical as “cognition” in moral decision-making and
behavior. Second, the capacity for self-control does not necessarily depend
on intellectual faculties of knowledge and understanding. Rather, selfcontrol abilities depend on the balanced relationship between cognitive and
emotional processes, both of which are critical in mediating and regulating
our impulses and behavior. This dependence entails that a disruption in
either the emotional or cognitive processes involved in self-control are
equally capable of endangering one’s controlled choice of behavior. Thus,
one can retain perfect factual and moral knowledge or understanding
capacities, yet remain incapable of making adaptive choices or controlling
one’s impulses.
A. “KNOWING” WITHOUT “FEELING” HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON
MORAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING

The word “emotion” comes from the Latin ex (out) + movere (to
move). 134 Its etymology is consistent with its core function, namely that
emotions compel people to act and motivate them to act in a given way. 135
Psychologists and neuroscientists have developed numerous theories of
emotions in order to understand the particular rationality of emotional
reactions. These theories come in many varieties, but they largely impugn
the view that emotions are mere primitive states that only distort
reasoning. 136 Rather, they share the idea that emotions—both basic 137 and
moral 138—provide critical guidance in reasoning and decision-making
processes.
134
Emotion, English Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com
/definition / emotion [https://perma.cc/GQ6G-BEYL] (last visited June 16, 2018).
135
Rene Rosfort & Giovanni Stanghellini, How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in
Psychiatry, 20 J. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 381, 385 (2014) (“Emotions are the lived motivation
for movement. Emotions are kinetic, dynamic forces that drive us in our ongoing
interactions with the environment.”).
136
See Jennifer Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
799 (2015); Elizabeth Phelps et al., Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple Modulatory
Neural Circuits, 37 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 263 (2014).
137
The category of basic emotions covers a disputed territory. By and large, basic
emotions are discrete mental states including primitive emotions like happiness, sadness,
fear, anger, and the like. See Paul Ekman, Basic Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND
EMOTION 45 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999).
138
Moral emotions (also referred to as social emotions) differ from basic emotions, for
they are intrinsically linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or of
persons other than the agent. See Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852 (Richard Davidson, Klaus Sherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith eds.,
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According to most accredited scientific accounts, emotions serve a
variety of functions within decision-making and behavior. First, and
foremost, emotions have an appraisal (or evaluative) function: 139 that is,
when people receive or perceive inputs (or stimuli, or events) from the
environment, emotions act to provide meaning and value to the information
being processed, and thus act as strong influences in pursuing appropriate
behavior in response to that appraised information. Importantly, emotional
appraisals strongly influence cognitive functions. 140–141 Second, emotions
are motivational states. 142 Upon perception and appraisal of external
stimuli, emotions help people select responses and thus motivate their
behavior in responding to stimuli in an appropriate way. 143 Third, emotions
are adaptive: 144 they help people prioritize and organize their behavior in
ways that optimize their adjustment to the demands of the physical and
social environment.
Thus, emotions modulate people’s behavioral
responses by appropriately tuning their decisions to the demands or
opportunities offered by the environment, thereby allowing them to

2003); see also Kathryn F. Jankowski & Hidehiko Takahashi, Cognitive Neuroscience of
Social Emotions and Implications for Psychopathology: Examining Embarrassment, Guilt,
Envy, and Schadenfreude, 68 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 319 (2014) (“Social
emotions are affective states elicited during social interactions and integral for promoting
socially appropriate behaviors and discouraging socially inappropriate ones.”).
139
See generally MAGDA ARNOLD, EMOTION AND PERSONALITY (1960); Richard S.
Lazarus, Thoughts on the Relation Between Emotion and Cognition, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 1019
(1982); Klaus R. Scherer, Neuroscience Findings are Consistent with Appraisal Theories of
Emotion; But Does The Brain “Respect” Constructionism?, 35 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 163
(2012).
140
See Zhong Lin-Lu & Barbara Anne Dosher, Cognitive Psychology, 2 SCHOLARPEDIA
2769 (2007) (explaining that in neuroscience, cognitive functions refer to cerebral activities
that lead to knowledge, including all means and mechanisms of acquiring information.
Cognitive functions encompass reasoning, memory, learning attention, and language and
lead directly to the attainment of information and, thus, knowledge).
141
Mark D. Lewis & Rebecca M. Todd, Getting Emotional: A Neural Perspective on
Emotion, Intention, and Consciousness, 12 J. CONSCIOUS STUD. 210, 212 (2005) (“[T]he
biological function of emotion is to impel appropriate behavior, given past learning and
precedent circumstances, by steering attention toward useful options for acting on the world
and urging one to pursue them. Thus, cognition in general . . . is assumed to be guided by
emotional relevance.”).
142
LAMBERT DECKERS,
MOTIVATION: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL 367–98 (3d ed 2009); NICO H. FRIJDA, Emotions and Action, in FEELINGS
AND EMOTIONS 158–73 (Antony S.R. Manstead, Nico Frijda & Agneta Fisher eds., 2004).
143
FRIJDA, supra note 142 at 158–73; see also Carroll E. Izard, Emotion Theory and
Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and Emerging Issues, 60 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 1 (2009).
144
Datcher Keltner & James J. Gross, Functional Accounts of Emotions, 13 COGNITION
& EMOTION 467 (1999).
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effectively apply the decision to take action. 145 Lastly, emotions are
regulatory: they regulate the maintenance of internal bodily integrity, such
that an organism can be prepared for specific reactions. 146 Thus, emotions
regulate bodily responses by prompting specific reactions to external
inputs. 147
Importantly, neuroscientific studies suggest that emotions play their
guiding role in decision-making at both subconscious and conscious
levels. 148 For a long time, an individual’s emotional life was generally
understood as a subconscious phenomenon belonging solely to the
subcortical regions, the most primitive regions of the brain (notably, the
limbic structures such as the amygdala), 149 while cognition was attributed to
the highly developed, neocortical regions (notably, the prefrontal cortex
[PFC]). 150 As such, scientific research long endorsed the view that the
high functions of reasoning and decision-making were solely served by
cognitive faculties. 151
145

Id. at 470 (“Emotions are adaptations to problems in the current human
environment.”).
146
See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTIONS IN
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 39 (1999) (asserting that emotions are part of the regulation
of one’s homeostasis, i.e. “the coordinated and largely automated physiological reactions
required to maintain steady internal states in a living organism”). For example, when we are
confronted with a threatening situation, the negative emotion of fear puts our brain and our
body out of balance, for it provokes physiological changes such as rapid heartbeat and
breathing. While provoking physiological changes, fear will predict the threat and prompt us
to respond to and cope with that threat, and thus regain homeostasis by adjusting its
physiological processes.
147
Id.
148
See supra note 8.
149
See, e.g., James W. Papez, A Proposed Mechanism of Emotion, 79 ARCHIVES
NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 725 (1937).
150
See W. Gerrod Parrott & Jay Schulkin, Neuropsychology and the Cognitive Nature of
the Emotions, 7 COGNITION & EMOTION 43 (1993).
151
See, e.g., Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotions Circuits in the Brain, 23 ANN. REV.
NEUROSCIENCE 155, 156 (2000) (“Why did research on the brain mechanisms of emotion
come to a halt after midcentury? . . . For one thing, emotion research was a victim of the
cognitive revolution. The emergence of cognitive science shifted the interest of those
concerned with the relation between psychological functions and neural mechanisms toward
processes [perception and memory, for example] that were readily thought of in terms of
computer-like operations . . . . Another factor that hindered work on emotions in
neuroscience was that the problem of how the brain makes emotions seemed to have been
solved in the early 1950s by the limbic system concept . . . . This appealing and convincing
theory was the culmination of research on the brain mechanisms of emotion by many
researchers, extending back to the late nineteenth century . . . . Studies of how the brain
mediates cognitive processes seemingly had a long way to go to catch up with the deep
understanding that had been achieved about emotions, and researchers flocked to the new
and exciting topic of cognition and the brain to begin filling the gap.”).
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In contrast to this outdated perspective, more recent studies have
expanded the conception of the scope of the “emotional brain.” 152 In
particular, these studies have supported the view that emotional processes
also involve significant participation of the neocortical regions—notably,
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VmPFC) and the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC). 153 Studies on the neocortical dimension of emotional processes
have led neuroscientists to also maintain a strong interrelation between
cognitive and emotional processes in decision-making. 154 One crucial
insight emerging from this line of research is that emotional and cognitive
processes involved in decision-making often engage overlapping neural
mechanisms. 155 Therefore, there is not a clear-cut distinction between
“emotion” and “cognition” in decision-making processes in the brain, but
“emotion” and “cognition” are strictly intertwined and they equally
contribute to the production of decisions and behavior as a consequence.
Considering the significant involvement of emotion-related brain
circuits in decision-making tasks, neuroscientists have come to attribute a
fundamental role to emotions, when paired with cognitions, in helping to
guide decision-making and behavioral outcomes. As Elizabeth Johnston
and Leah Olson have suggested, “[t]he so called ‘cognitive’ brain functions,
such as attention, perception, learning and memory, and decision-making
can no longer be seen as separate and distinct from emotions; instead, they
are inextricably infused with emotional assessments and feelings that
accompany them.” 156 In a nutshell, the neuropsychological sciences have
largely rejected the view that emotions are necessarily “disturbing factors”

152
See, e.g., Don Tucker et al., Anatomy and Physiology of Human Emotion: Vertical
Integration of Brainstem, Limbic, and Cortical Systems, in HANDBOOK OF THE
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION 56 (Joan C. Borod ed., 2000).
153
See infra 189–95.
154
See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: REASON, EMOTION, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 54–79 (1994); Jennifer Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision-Making, 66 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 799, 802–11 (2015); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Emotion and Decision
Making: Multiple Modulatory Neural Circuits, 37 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 263, 267–81
(2014); Megan Speer & Mauricio Delgado, Emotion-Cognition Interactions in Memory and
Decision-Making, in STEVEN’S HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 591, 596–605 (John Wixed & Eric Jan Wagermakers eds, 2018).
155
See Richard J. Davidson, Cognitive Neuroscience Needs Affective Neuroscience (and
Vice Versa), 42 BRAIN & COGNITION 89, 91 (2000) (“Cognition would be rudderless without
the accompaniment of emotion, just as emotion would be primitive without the participation
of cognition.”).
156
ELIZABETH JOHNSTON & LEAH OLSON, THE FEELING BRAIN: THE BIOLOGY AND
PSYCHOLOGY AND EMOTIONS 307 (2015).
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for decision-making or that emotions can possibly be factored out of the
decision-making processes. 157
The influential role of emotions in guiding deliberations and behavior,
as well as the strict interrelation between emotional and cognitive functions
in decision-making processes, have been further contextualized in moral
judgments. A growing body of behavioral literature has consistently
indicated that emotions—most notably, certain moral emotions 158—are the
core driving force of the deliberative processes involved in moral
judgments. 159 By and large, moral emotions help people recognize and
appreciate the moral value of given morally salient stimuli (e.g., good or
bad, right or wrong). 160 Based on this evaluation, moral emotions motivate
and orient people’s reactions to those stimuli and consequently help them
adapt decisional and behavioral responses. 161 Ultimately, moral emotions
profoundly influence one’s “adherence (or lack of adherence) to moral
standards.” 162
Different moral emotions convey different information about various
perceived events and shape moral judgments by prioritizing different sociomoral concerns. 163 Hence, moral emotions affect moral decisions and
behavior in varying ways. 164 For example, some studies have shown the

157

Id.
Notwithstanding the various classifications that have been proposed, moral emotions
are by and large classified in four main categories: self-conscious moral emotions (including
guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride); other-condemning emotions (anger, disgust,
contempt); other-praising emotions (love, elevation); other-suffering emotions (compassion).
See Haidt, supra note 138.
159
See infra notes 165–63.
160
See Dacher Keltner et al., Emotions as Moral Intuitions, in AFFECT IN SOCIAL
THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 161, 164–68 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2006).
161
See Rimma Teper et al., How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior: Some Answers (and
Questions) for the Field of Moral Psychology, 91 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS
1, 5 (2015) (“Within the past decade, psychologists have theorized about the ways in which
these emotions might drive moral decision making, in both their real and anticipated
forms . . . . For instance, people might be motivated to relieve the pre-decisional negative
affect (e.g. guilt), avoid post-decisional anticipated negative affect (e.g. shame), or achieve
post-decisional positive affect . . . . In other words, moral emotions can provide both the
information and motivational force to do the ‘right thing’ . . . .”).
162
See June Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 345, 347 (2007).
163
See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Horberg et al., Emotions as Moral Amplifiers: An Appraisal
Tendency Approach to the Influences of Distinct Emotions upon Moral Judgment, 3
EMOTION REV. 237, 238 (2011).
164
Id.
158
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crucial relevance of guilt, 165 in combination with other-oriented empathy, in
inhibiting antisocial impulses and promoting prosocial behavior. 166 Other
work has connected compassion to concerns about caring for and reducing
harm to others, particularly those in need. 167 Compassion is aroused by
perceptions of the need, suffering, or weakness of others, and motivates
prosocial action even if it is costly to the self.168 Research has found that
compassion prominently shapes moral judgments of harm and care.169
Other studies have instead focused on the relationship between moral
judgments and empathy. 170 Notwithstanding the lack of a unanimous
definition of empathy, it can be defined as a multi-dimensional 171 socioaffective process consisting of “gaining information about the internal
affective representations of others,” 172 thereby eliciting vicarious emotional
responses. 173 Although the way empathy—and, notably, each of its
components, namely emotional sharing, perspective-taking, and empathic
concern 174—interacts with and influences morality is debated, 175 convincing
165

See June P. Tangney et al., Shame, Guilt and Remorse: Implications for Offender
Populations, 22 J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 706 (2011).
166
See Linda Torstveit et al., Empathy, Guilt Proneness and Gender: Relative
Contributions to Prosocial Behaviour, 12 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 260, 265–66 (2016); Jeffrey
Stewing et al., Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links Among the Moral
Emotions, Externalization of Blame, and Aggression, 44 J. RES. PERSONALITY 91 (2010).
167
See, e.g., Helen Y. Weng et al., The Role of Compassion in Altruistic Helping and
Punishment Behavior, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 12 (2015).
168
Jennifer L. Goetz et al., Compassion: An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical
Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 351, 356 (2010).
169
See id. at 354.
170
See generally infra notes 177–76.
171
See Mark H. Davis, Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a
Multidimensional Approach, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113 (1983).
172
See Giuseppe Ugazio et al., Are Empathy and Morality Linked? Insights from Moral
Psychology, Social and Decision Neuroscience, and Philosophy, in EMPATHY AND
MORALITY 155, 161 (Heidi Maibom ed., 2014).
173
See Nancy Einseberg et al., Empathy-Related Responding: Associations with
Prosocial Behavior, Aggression, and Intergroup Relations, 4 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 143
(2010).
174
Emotional sharing (sometimes referred to as empathic arousal or emotional
contagion) reflects the natural capacity to become affectively aroused by others’ emotions.
Perspective-taking is the ability to consciously put oneself into the mind of another
individual and imagine what that person is thinking or feeling. Empathic concern
corresponds to the motivation of caring for another’s welfare. Critically, neuroscientific
research suggests that each of these facets of empathy emerges from specific neurobiological
processes—both emotional and cognitive. Thus, it is very likely that each empathy facet
uniquely influences moral cognition and predicts differential outcomes in moral behavior.
See, e.g., Raeanne C. Moore et al., Distinct Neural Correlates of Emotional and Cognitive
Empathy in Older Adults, 232 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 42 (2015); Sylvia Morelli
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evidence exists supporting the claim that empathy does have an overall
bearing on moral judgments. 176 Especially concerning other individuals,
empathy promotes caregiving behavior, and it also leads to aversions to
violence. 177
Some authors have suggested a particularly key role for “empathic
concern”—that is, the motivation of caring for another’s welfare—in
informing moral judgments, for empathic concern is largely involved in
altruistic behavior in response to someone in distress. 178 Studies using the
“trolley dilemma,” 179 an iconic experiment in moral philosophy, have
indicated that people with low levels of empathic concern are more likely to
endorse utilitarian solutions to personal moral dilemmas: solutions that
require personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good. 180
Importantly, neuroscientific studies testing this hypothesis have related
empathic concern to activity in the amygdala and the VmPFC that, as

et al., The Neural Basis of Empathy for Components of Empathy: Predicting Daily Prosocial
Behavior, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 39 (2014); Jamil Zaki & Kevin N.
Ochsner, The Neuroscience of Empathy: Progress, Pitfalls, and Promise, 15 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 675 (2012).
175
See, e.g., Jean Decety & Jason M. Cowell, Friends or Foes: Is Empathy Necessary
for Moral Behavior?, 9 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 525, 530 (2015).
176
See, e.g., Jamil Zaki, Empathy is a Moral Force, in ATLAS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
49 (Kurt Gray & Jesse Graham eds., 2018); Geert-Jan Will & Eduard T. Klapwijk, Neural
Systems Involved in Moral Judgment and Moral Action, 34 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10459 (2014);
Keith Yoder & Jean Decety, The Neuroscience of Morality and Social Decision-Making, 24
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 279 (2018); Fang Cui et al., Moral Judgment Modulates Neural
Responses to the Perception of Other’s Pain: An ERP Study, 6 SCI. REP. 1 (2016).
177
See Jean Decety & Jason M. Cowell, Empathy, Justice, and Moral Behavior, 6 AJOB
NEUROSCIENCE 3 (2015); see also Ugazio et al., supra note 172, at 165 (noting that
“[e]mpathy, by eliciting feelings of approbation or disapprobation, can be used to decide
whether an action should be considered morally right or wrong . . . . Furthermore, by making
a person aware of the emotional state of others, empathy can motivate people to judge and
eventually act accordingly. For instance, if someone is in a negative emotional state as a
result of another person’s actions, for example, feels pain after being hit by another person,
empathy may motivate an observer to judge that hitting others is morally wrong and, by
extension, may motivate him to help the victim.”).
178
See, e.g., Oriel FeldmanHall et al., Empathic Concern Drives Costly Altruism, 105
NEUROIMAGE 347, 352–54 (2015).
179
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 THE
MONIST 204 (1976).
180
Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht & Liane Young, Low Levels of Empathic Concern Predict
Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 8 PLOS ONE e60418 (2013); Indrajeet Patil & Giorgia Silani,
Reduced Empathic Concern Leads to Utilitarian Moral Judgments in Trait Alexithymia, 5
FRONT. PSYCHOL. 501 (2014); Liane Young et al., Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal
Cortex Impairs Judgment of Harmful Intent, 65 NEURON 845 (2010).
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discussed in more detail shortly, are key brain regions of the socioemotional circuitry involved in moral judgments.
The insights into the relationship among moral emotions, empathy,
and moral judgments are further complemented by neuroscientific advances
regarding the neural correlates 181 of moral judgment and decision-making.
While brain scans alone cannot exactly determine which emotions are at
stake in moral judgments and decision-making, studies using neuroimaging
techniques “have consistently implicated those brain regions implicated in
emotional processing, including moral emotion processing.” 182– 183
Importantly, the growing body of these studies has led several
neuroscientists to indicate the existence of a “neuromoral network,” 184 a
network of brain areas that appear to be constantly and significantly
involved in moral judgment and decision-making. According to the
prevailing view, the best-replicated neural correlates of morality broadly
recruit a fronto-temporo-subcortical network, and therefore comprise both
cognitive and emotional components. 185 The “cognitive” components of
the moral circuit are mainly localized in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

181
Neural correlates can be defined as the neuronal mechanisms that correspond with—
i.e., correlate directly with—a particular experience. For instance, research refers to the
neural correlates of consciousness as “the minimum neural mechanisms sufficient for any
one specific conscious percept.” See Christof Koch et al., Neural Correlates of
Consciousness: Progress and Problems, 17 NAT. REV. NEUROSCI. 307 (2016).
182
James Blair & Katherine Fowler, Moral Emotions and Moral Reasoning from the
Perspective of Affective Cognitive Neuroscience: A Selective Review, 2 EUR. J. DEV. SCI.
303, 314 (2008).
183
Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral
Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ
NEUROPSIQUIATR 657 (2001); Jorge Moll et al., Functional Networks in Emotional Moral
and Nonmoral Social Judgments, 16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002); Joshua Greene et al., An
fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001);
Joshua Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389 (2004).
184
See Mario F. Mendez, The Neurobiology of Moral Behavior: Review and
Neuropsychiatric Implications, 14 CNS SPECTR. 608 (2009); Leo Pascual et al., How Does
Morality Work in the Brain? A Functional and Structural Perspective of Moral Behavior, 7
FRONT. INTEGR. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013); Kristine Prehn & Hauke Heekeren, Moral
Judgment and the Brain: A Functional Approach to the Question of Emotion and Cognition
in Moral Judgment Integrating Psychology, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Biology, in THE
MORAL BRAIN: ESSAYS ON THE EVOLUTIONARY AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MORALITY
129 (Johan Braeckman, Jan Verplaetse & Jelle De Schrijver eds., 2009); Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGN. SCI. 517
(2002).
185
See Mendez, supra note 184, at 608–09.
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(DLPFC) 186 and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC); 187 the “emotional”
components of the moral circuitry instead involve the amygdala, 188 the
OFC, 189 and notably the VmPFC, 190 which is also thought of as the
“integrative center for innate morality.” 191 The latter areas support specific
affective aspects of moral judgment and decision-making, including
emotional perception, sensitivity to reward and punishment, and
motivation, especially in so-called “care-based morality.” 192
Roughly, studies suggest that the socio-emotional mechanism involved
in moral judgment and decision-making goes as follows: perceived or
received morally salient stimuli are first processed at the sub-cortical level
by certain structures of the limbic system, in particular the amygdala. 193
Upon receiving a stimulus, the amygdala attaches either a positive or a
negative emotional valence to it (e.g., good or bad), which is represented as
an outcome valence within the VmPFC and the OFC. 194 The VmPFC
“mediates automatic moral and ‘prosocial’ reactions, such as discomfort at
the prospect of being a direct agent of a personal moral violation or of harm
to someone else,” 195 thereby becoming very active in moral emotions that
are positively linked to prosocial behavior, such as guilt or compassion.

186
See Kristine Prehn et al., Individual Differences in Moral Judgment Competence
Influence Neural Correlates of Socio-Normative Judgments, 3 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 33 (2008).
187
Id.
188
See James Blair, The Amygdala and the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality
and Psychopathy, 11 TRENDS COGN. SCI. 387 (2007).
189
See Pascual, supra note 184.
190
See Blair, supra note 188; Liane Young & Michael Koenigs, Investigating Emotion
in Moral Cognition: A Review of Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging and
Neuropsychology, 84 BRIT. MED. BULL. 69 (2007); Chuanpeng Hu & Xiaoming Jiang, An
Emotion Regulation Role of Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Moral Judgment, 8 FRONT.
HUM. NEUROSCI. 873 (2014).
191
Donatella Marazziti et al., The Neurobiology of Moral Sense: Facts or Hypotheses?,
12 ANNALS GEN. PSYCHIATRY 6 (2013).
192
See Blair, supra note 188 (describing care-based morality as “those forms of moral
reasoning that concern actions that harm others”).
193
See, e.g., Pascual, supra note 184; Amitai Shenhav & Joshua Greene, Integrating
Moral Judgment: Dissociating the Roles of the Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal
Cortex, 34 J. NEUROSCI. 4741 (2014); Manuela Fumagalli & Alberto Priori, Functional and
Clinical Neuroanatomy of Morality, 135 BRAIN (2006).
194
See, e.g., Pascual, id.; Liane Young & Michael Koenigs, Investigating Emotion in
Moral Cognition: A Review of Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging and
Neuropsychology, 84 BR. MED. BULL. 69 (2007); Abigail A. Marsh et al., Reduced
Amygdala-Orbitofrontal Connectivity during Moral Judgments in Youths with Disruptive
Behavior Disorders and Psychopathic Traits, 194 PSYCHIATRY RES. 279 (2011).
195
Mendez, supra note 184, at 610.
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Also, the VmPFC attributes moral and emotional values to social stimuli,
anticipates their future outcome, and modulates the mechanisms of
empathy 196 and perception of others’ intentions. While the VmPFC serves
mostly an evaluative function in the processing of emotional stimuli, the
OFC serves the function of filtering emotional stimuli, dampening arousal
to irrelevant inputs, and maintaining neural focus on task-relevant
associations. 197 In so doing, the OFC mediates aversive responses related
to the social context, modifies responses based on feedback, and inhibits
automatic behavior triggered by the amygdala.
The critical role of socio-emotional brain circuits in moral judgment
and decision-making has received further support in lesion studies. For
instance, Sobhani and Bechara 198 indicated that anatomical lesions to and
dysfunctions of the VmPFC and its reciprocal connections with the
amygdala appear to lead to a lack of empathic concern, a diminished sense
of guilt and inappropriate social behavior. In a study on VmPFC patients,
Koenigs et al. 199 administered personal and non-personal moral dilemmas
tests to VmPFC-damaged patients. While these patients provided the same
utilitarian responses to non-personal harm dilemmas as the control subjects,
they showed a far more marked utilitarian reasoning in personal moral
dilemmas, compared to the control subjects. 200 In addition to confirming
the crucial role of the VmPFC in attaching emotional valences to moral
considerations, these researchers also observed that normal utilitarian
reasoning in impersonal dilemmas confirms that VmPFC patients retain
intact cognitive intellectual abilities. 201 Likewise, Mario Mendez et al. 202
confirmed the crucial role of the VmPFC in moral judgment and decisionmaking. They found that patients with frontotemporal dementia, who are
characterized by a lack of empathic concern and likelihood to engage in
196

See supra note 181.
Joshua Knabb et al., Neuroscience, Moral Reasoning, and the Law, 27 BEHAV. SCI.
L. 219, 221 (2009).
198
Mona Sobhani & Antoine Bechara, A Somatic Marker Perspective of Immoral and
Corrupt Behavior, 6 SOC. NEUROSCI. 640, 640–41 (2011).
199
Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral
Judgments, 446 NATURE 908 (2007).
200
Id. at 910 (“VMPC patients’ judgements differed from comparison subjects’ only for
the high-conflict personal moral dilemmas, all of which featured competing considerations
of aggregate welfare on the one hand, and, on the other hand, harm to others that would
normally evoke a strong social emotion. Low-conflict personal moral scenarios lacked this
degree of competition.”).
201
Id. (“[T]he current results suggest that the VMPC is a critical neural substrate for the
intuitive/affective but not for the conscious/rational system.”).
202
Mario Mendez et al., An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal
Dementia, 18 COGN. BEHAV. NEUROL. 193 (2005).
197
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antisocial conduct, also tended to favor the utilitarian action in personal
moral dilemmas. 203
Additional support for this view has been provided by neuroimaging
studies conducted on psychopathic individuals. 204 Raine and Yang 205
reviewed and integrated literature on moral reasoning and antisocial
behavior to trace a neural moral model of antisocial behavior with a focus
on psychopathy. Interestingly, their study found that the key brain areas
that are either structurally or functionally impaired in patients suffering
from psychopathy (e.g., the VmPFC or the amygdala) correspond to those
being part of the socio-emotional circuitry of the neuromoral network (i.e.,
areas that are significantly involved in emotional processing, including
moral emotion processing). 206 Impairments in these brain areas seem to
explain why patients affected by this type of disorder show severe empathy
deficits (notably, a lack of empathic concern), callousness or emotional
flatness, and deficiencies in using emotional information to regulate their
behavior and to respond to other individuals’ distress. 207 Importantly,
individuals with psychopathy do seem to retain a “cognitive” understanding
of moral and legal wrongs. 208 However, as one study indicated,
psychopaths treat the word “wrong” in a purely conventional way, as if it

203
Id. at 195–96 (“The FTD patients differed in the way they responded to an
emotionally based ‘personal’ moral dilemma compared with the AD patients and normal
control subjects. The FTD patients retained knowledge of moral rules and norms and could
reason about the right and wrong of a situation. In contrast, they appeared to have
diminished emotional identification with others and solved moral dilemmas in an impersonal
fashion.”).
204
The neuroscientific literature on psychopathy is very wide. See generally KENT A.
KIEHL & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHY AND LAW (2013);
Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths
as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 677 (2001);
R.J.R. Blair, Responding to the Emotions of Others: Dissociating Forms of Empathy
Through the Study of Typical and Psychiatric Population, 14 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGN. 698
(2005); Yaling Yang et al., Morphological Alterations in the Prefrontal Cortex and the
Amygdala in Unsuccessful Psychopaths, 119 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 546 (2010).
205
Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and
Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGN. & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 203 (2006).
206
Id. at 205–06.
207
See, e.g., Jean Decety et al., Brain Response to Empathy-Eliciting Scenarios
Involving Pain in Incarcerated Individuals with Psychopathy, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 638
(2013).
208
Neil Levy, The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited, 14 PHIL. PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHOL. 129, 132 (2007) (claiming that psychopaths know their actions “are widely
perceived to be wrong . . . they are unable to grasp the distinctive nature and significance of
their wrongness”).
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simply meant prohibited by local authorities. 209 This means that even if
psychopaths are perfectly capable of propositionally distinguishing
rightness from wrongness, and therefore of knowing the moral meaning of a
given action, they tend to make socially poor or immoral decisions because
they are unable to generate the feelings that guide adaptive decision-making
in healthy individuals.
All things considered, neuroscientific studies seem to confirm the
substantial artificiality of the net distinction between “cognition” and
“emotion” in moral judgment and decision-making. First, emotion is not
essentially disruptive to moral reasoning; rather, it is part of it. Second,
knowledge or understanding of moral wrongs does not lead to moral
behavior if it exists without emotional influence. That is, appreciating the
moral meaning of one’s own conduct does not simply require verbal
knowledge of what is right and what is wrong, but also a feeling of the
moral significance of given conduct in a given social context. 210
Changing the perspective on moral (and antisocial) decision-making
may have significant implications for criminal law’s rationalist conception
of the culpable agent. If emotions and feelings are integral parts of the
mental processes leading to moral decisions and behaviors, a truly accurate
model of the legally relevant mind that underpins culpability-related
doctrines such as insanity should also include the emotional dimension in
its relevant substance. Emotion and affect have a bearing on moral
rationality, and the cognitive ability to know the value of an action does not
sufficiently explain one’s capacity to behave morally in a given social
context without also considering emotional influences. Considering these
insights, a rational moral agent is one who is also able to emotionally
appreciate—rather than simply know—the moral significance of his or her
conduct. 211 When this capacity is severely impaired, the agent falls short of
being a morally rational individual. Ideally, he or she should be excused.

209
R.J.R. Blair, A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the
Psychopath, 57 COGNITION 1 (1995).
210
See Raine & Yang, supra note 205, at 209 (“[I]t is predominantly the feeling of what
is moral that is deficient in antisocial groups, rather than the knowing of what is moral. This
moral feeling, centered on the PFC and amygdala, is the engine that translates the cognitive
recognition that an act is immoral into behavioral inhibition—and it is this engine that
functions less well in antisocial . . . individuals.”).
211
See Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry, Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 12
DUKE L J. 395, 397 (“The dictum, ‘Cogito, ergo sum,’ ‘I think, therefore I am,’ is, however,
the formula for the schizoid intellectual’s struggle to possess an ego. A healthy human being
would be more likely to start from ‘I feel, therefore I am’.”).
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B. SELF-CONTROL ABILITIES ALSO DEPEND ON EMOTIONS

Neuroscientific studies also dispute the legal conception of the (lack
of) capacity for self-control. Neuroscientific research on self-control is
ongoing, and a clear-cut taxonomy of self-control is lacking, 212 but there is
a consensus understanding of self-control rather as a multidimensional
construct 213 involving a number of distinct cognitive and socio-emotional
capacities, each of which contributes to individuals’ control abilities. 214
Regarding moral contexts, neuroscientific research suggests that
people’s capacity to regulate and inhibit impulses also—though not
exclusively—depends on their ability to “wilfully suspend” 215 immediate
gratifications in favor of long-term outcomes, which is critical to pro-social,
law-abiding behavior. 216 This ability appears to depend on the reward

212
Joshua Buckholtz et al., A Neuro-Legal Lingua Franca: Bridging Law and
Neuroscience on the Issue of Self-Control, 5 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y. J. 1, 13 (2016).
Admittedly, behavioral and neuroscientific terminology regarding self-control manifests a
lack of conceptual clarity. Looking at the literature, the notion of self-control is either related
to or distinguished from other abilities including cognitive control, self-regulation, or
emotion regulation. Each of these abilities appears to have a role in buffering impulsive
behavior. See infra notes 214–16. In this Section, I mostly refer to what psychological and
neuroscientific literature frequently addresses as “self-regulation,” and to its role in impulse
and behavioral control.
213
Id. at 13.
214
See Marc Lewis & Rebecca Todd, The Self-Regulating Brain: Cortical-Subcortical
Feedback and the Development of Intelligent Action, 22 COGN. DEV. 406 (2007); Ethan
Kross & Kevin Ochsner, Integrating Research on Self-control Across Multiple Levels of
Analysis: Insights from Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, in SELF CONTROL IN
SOCIETY, MIND, AND BRAIN 76 (Ran Hassin, Kevin Ochsner, & Yacoov Trope eds., 2010);
Sezin Öner, Neural Substrates of Cognitive Emotion Regulation: A Brief Review, 28
PSYCHIATRY & CLIN. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 91 (2017).
215
See Cole Korponay & Michael Koenigs, The Neurobiology of Antisocial and Amoral
Behavior, in LEGAL INSANITY AND THE BRAIN 27 (Sofia Moratti & Dennis Patterson eds.,
2016).
216
Id. In psychological and neuroscientific literature, this ability is frequently referred to
as “self-regulation”: see, e.g., Lambros Lazarus et al., The Roles of Impulsivity, Selfregulation, and Emotion Regulation in the Experience of Self-disgust, 43 MOTIV. &
EMO. 145, 147 (2019) (defining self-regulation as “people’s capacity to focus on their
long-term goals and resist temptation and impulses for immediate gratification . . . As
such, self-regulation involves the ability to alter thoughts, actions, and emotions in a way
that serves goal striving, whether the goal is set by the self, the society or both.”). While
some authors use the term self-regulation and self-control interchangeably, others
consider self-control to be a subset of self-regulation or vice versa. See, e.g., Wilehlm
Hoffmann et al., Executive Functions and Self-regulation, 16 TRENDS IN COGN. SCI., 174,
174 (2012) (defining self-regulation as “goal-directed behavior” and self-control as “a
narrower subset of self-regulatory processes [aiming] to override unwanted, prepotent
impulses or urges . . . .”). Cfr. Buckholtz et al. supra note 212 at 15–16 (referring to the
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system, which involves and connects the activity of both prototypical
emotional subcortical (including the amygdala, the ventral tegmental area
and the nucleus accumbens) and neocortical brain areas (notably the
DLPFC, dorsal-ACC [dACC], the OFC, and the VmPFC), both of which
serve interdependent functions of emotional processing, motivation, and
inhibition in goal-directed behavior. 217 Studies indicate that subcortical
regions involved in the reward system, such as the amygdala, process
perceptual stimuli (events) through the generation of appropriate emotional
responses. 218 Consequently, the prefrontal regions exert modulatory control
on the representation of perceptual stimuli, and thus in turn modulate the
expression and evaluation of emotions. 219 Put this way, the emotional
response to a given event (or stimulus) facilitates the exertion of cognitive
control. In its turn, cognitive control—also referred to as executive
functions—appears to downregulate emotional inputs.
As emerges from this brief explanation, there is nothing in the brain
resembling an absolute regulator and an absolute regulatee of impulses and
behavior. Rather, impulse and behavioral regulation are governed by a
sufficiently powerful coordination system between subcortical and cortical
brain structures and, thus, they largely involve cognitive and emotional
functions. 220 As Lewis and Todd suggested, cortical and subcortical
regions stand in a reciprocal relationship during decision-making and selfregulation in that “cortical activities regulate subcortical activities through
executive modulation of prepotent appraisals and emotional responses;
[while] subcortical systems regulate the cortex by tuning its activities to the
demands or opportunities provided by the environment.” 221 Therefore,
emotional appraisal of external stimuli, and cognitive control over
emotional responses are both critical in guaranteeing appropriate choices
and thus behavioral outcomes.

ability to delay immediate gratification in favor of long-term outcomes as a specific domain
of self-control).
217
Id.
218
See, e.g., Elizabeth Murray, The Amygdala, Reward and Emotion, 11 TRENDS COGN.
SCI. 489 (2007).
219
See, e.g., Öner, supra note 214; Liyang Sai et al., Individual Differences in the
Habitual Use of Cognitive Reappraisal Predict the Reward-Related Processing, 6 FRONT.
PSYCHOL. 1256 (2015); J.T. Buhle et al., Cognitive Reappraisal of Emotion: A MetaAnalysis of Human Neuroimaging Studies, 24 CEREB. CORTEX 2981 (2014).
220
See Lewis & Todd, supra note 214, at 412 (“Coordination across levels of the
neuroaxis is a powerful vehicle for self-regulation, and specifying particular structures at
particular levels opens the door to a precise descriptive language for modeling psychological
self-regulation using neural terms.”).
221
Id. at 406.
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Importantly, the systems involved in inhibition and impulse regulation
may be irrespective of an individual’s moral knowledge or understanding of
his or her conduct. As Sapolsky described it, “it is possible for a person to
retain the cognitive capacity to distinguish right from wrong behaviour and,
nonetheless, for reasons of mental illness, to be organically incapable of
regulating the appropriateness of their behaviour.” 222 Confirming this
account, lesion studies have suggested that people with abnormalities in the
functioning of the emotion-related brain regions involved in the reward
system—like the VmPFC—possess adequate social and moral knowledge,
but appear to be unable to effectively apply that knowledge to action. 223
Consequently, even if they are able to state what they should do in a given
moral situation, they choose to do something else.
As Miller et al. observed, these findings suggest that the VmPFC
functions as the “site of interaction” of “valuation and self-control
processes” 224 during decision-making. Such interaction seems “to facilitate
successful self-control.” 225 Importantly, these results fit into the larger
body of data indicating the important role of the VmPFC in mediating and
integrating cognitive and emotional influences on decision-making and
behavior. 226 Antonio Damasio’s famous work on his young patient, to
whom he referred as Elliot, supports the latter claim. Elliot had undergone
a radical personality change after a surgery to remove a brain tumor on the
surface of his frontal lobes. 227 Elliot’s intelligence had remained
substantially intact after the operation.228

222
Robert Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL.
TRANS. R. SOC’Y. LOND. B. 1787, 1790 (2004).
223
See, e.g., Young et al., supra note 180; Rupa Gupta et al., The Amygdala and
Decision-Making, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 760 (2011).
224
Erica Miller et al., Delay Discounting: A Two-Systems Perspective, HANDBOOK OF
EMOTION REGULATION 93, 102 (James Gross ed., 2d ed 2014).
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
DAMASIO, supra note 154, at 36 (“The surgery was a success in every respect, and
insofar as such tumors tend not to grow again, the outlook was excellent. What was to prove
less felicitous was the turn in Elliot’s personality. The changes, which began during his
physical recovery, astonished family and friends. . . . In many ways . . . Elliot was no longer
Elliot.”).
228
Id. (“To be sure, Elliot’s smarts and his ability to move about and use language were
unscathed . . . . His knowledge base seemed to survive, and he could perform many separate
actions as well as before.”).
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However, Elliot became disinhibited, undisciplined, and unemotive. 229
In post-surgery tests, as Damasio wrote, “Elliot emerged as a man with a
normal intellect who was unable to decide properly, especially when the
decision involved personal and social matters.” 230 Damasio gave Elliot a
test that showed one additional post-operation change: Elliot’s VmPFC
damage had compromised his ability to feel and process emotion, and thus
to make personal and socially appropriate decisions. 231 “[T]he coldbloodedness of Elliot’s reasoning,” writes Damasio, “prevented him from
assigning different values to different options, and made his decisionmaking landscape hopelessly flat.” 232
In a famous series of lesion studies using the Iowa gambling task
(IGT), 233 Bechara et al. examined the decision-making of patients with
damage to the VmPFC. 234 This set of studies suggested that VmPFCdamaged patients tend to be insensitive to future consequences of their
choices, and are primarily guided by immediate gains. 235 As Jeremy Gray
observed, these findings suggest that patients with VmPFC damage “lack
mechanisms of emotion-related feedback that healthy participants use to
adaptively bias their choices in the IGT.” 236 Therefore, VmPFC patients’
decision-making abilities are impaired likely due to “their lack of an
appropriate affective basis on which to make adaptive choices.” 237

229

Id. at 38 (“The tragedy of this otherwise healthy and intelligent man was that he was
neither stupid nor ignorant, and yet he acted often as if he were. The machinery for his
decision making was so flawed that he could no longer be an effective social being.”).
230
Id. at 43.
231
See id. at 38–51.
232
Id. at 51. See also Miller et al., supra note 224, at 102 (“Elliot’s problem lay in
linking automatic valuation and regulatory control when necessary to make a decision.”).
233
Antoine Bechara et al., Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to
Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7 (1994). The IGT is a psychological task designed
to stimulate real-life decision making. Participants are required to choose between decks of
cards that yield high immediate gain but larger future loss, i.e., a long-term loss, and decks
that yield lower immediate gain but a smaller future loss, i.e., a long-term gain.
234
Id.; see also Antoine Bechara et al., Characterization of the Decision-Making of
Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189 (2000).
235
See id. at 2198 (“VM lesion patients preferred decks with high immediate reward to
those with smaller reward, although the decks with small reward were more advantageous in
the long term. VM lesion patients also preferred decks that had low immediate punishment
to those with higher immediate punishment, although the decks with higher immediate
punishment were more advantageous in the long run.”).
236
Jeremy Gray, Affect and Action Control, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMAN ACTION
277, 283 (Ezequiel Morsella, John Bargh & Peter Gollwitzer eds., 2009).
237
Id.
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In another study, Bechara et al. compared the different roles of
VmPFC and amygdala damages in volitional processes. 238 They concluded
that amygdala damages can hinder or strongly reduce one’s ability to
discern the emotional attributes of an emotionally charged stimulus. 239 As a
consequence, amygdala-damaged patients are unable to sufficiently
“experience the emotional attributes of a stimulus that is charged with
emotion.” 240 Similarly, a study by Hampton et al. indicated that patients
with amygdala damage exhibited a profound change in PFC activity related
to reward expectation and behavioral choice, indicating that information
related to behavioral choice in PFC relies directly on input from the
amygdala. 241 Altogether, these studies have indicated that abnormal
functioning in the amygdala may well have a significant negative impact on
emotional information processing at a cognitive level, resulting in poor
control over behavioral responses. 242
Additional support for this perspective emerges from studies on
neuropsychiatric antisocial populations. These studies found links between
deficits in socio-emotional brain circuits and inhibition. 243 They suggested
that those who show a lack of insight into their own behavior as well as a
lack of moral emotions and emotional responses towards others (e.g.,
empathy) 244 are less inhibited in violating the rights of others. For instance,
injury to the VmPFC and the ACC—which, once again, are critical in
emotional processing, as well as in behavioral motivation and regulation—
have been linked to the onset of reckless and antisocial behavior without
238
Antoine Bechara et al., Different Contributions of the Human Amygdala and Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex to Decision-Making, 19 J. NEUROSCI. 5473 (1999).
239
Id. at 5479 (“We see the impairment in decision-making after amygdala damage as
an indirect consequence of the role of the amygdala in attaching affective attributes to
stimuli.”).
240
Id. at 5473.
241
Alan N. Hampton et al., Contributions of the Amygdala to Reward Expectancy and
Choice Signals in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 55 NEURON 545 (2007).
242
See Steven Penney, Impulse Control and Criminal Responsibility: Lessons from
Neuroscience, 35 INT’L J.L. PSYCHIATRY 99, 100 (2012).
243
See also Birgit Völlm, Neurobiological Substrates of Antisocial and Borderline
Personality Disorder: Preliminary Results of a Functional fMRI Study, 14 CRIM. BEHAV.
MENTAL HEALTH 39 (2004); Lau Siew Tee & Norshia Fauzan, The Role of the Anterior
Cingulate Cortex and Amygdala on Criminal Behavior, 2 J. SCI. RES. & BEHAV. 203 (2015);
Cole Korponay et al., Impulsive-Antisocial Dimension of Psychopathy Linked to
Enlargement and Abnormal Functional Connectivity of the Striatum, 2 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY
149 (2017).
244
See also James Blair & Karina Blair, Empathy, Morality, and Social Convention:
Evidence from the Study of Psychopathy and Other Psychiatric Disorders, in THE SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, Ch. 11 (2009); Richard Davidson et al., Dysfunction in the
Neural Circuit of Emotion Regulation, 289 SCIENCE 591 (2000).
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remorse. 245 Importantly, as one study has highlighted, “[w]ithout the
restraint of intuitive moral emotions and self-other conjoining . . . patients
may not be able to deter an impulse to act in an unacceptable manner, even
as they know right and wrong and understand the nature of their acts.” 246
All things considered, neuroscience research impugns the legal
understanding of self-control in two main respects. First, self-control is not
a unitary capacity 247 that either exists or does not exist. Rather, a multitude
of complex and, sometimes, interrelated processes are involved self-control
abilities. These processes involve brain mechanisms that are not purely or
solely cognitive, but form complex circuits in which affective and
motivational processes also play a prominent role in the evaluation,
information processing, regulation, and appropriate reaction to salient
stimuli. Thus, as has been observed, because abilities of self-control appear
to depend on a multitude of dissociable processes, preserved functioning in
one of these processes may still be accompanied by poor functioning in
others. 248 Although this does not imply a total lack of the capacity for selfcontrol, this capacity may still be compromised.
Second, and consequently, people’s volitional power to choose which
conduct to engage in within a given context, and thus to regulate their
impulses, is not a logical consequence of their cognitive faculties of
knowledge and understanding. The neuroscientific studies reported above
suggest that the mechanisms involved in self-control support both cognitive
and emotional processes, which serve distinct—yet related—functions in
governing volitional faculties. A disruption in either cognitive or emotional
processes (e.g., maladaptive emotional responses or deficient cognitive
regulation) can equally endanger a given choice of appropriate behavior in
response to a certain stimulus. Therefore, the factual or moral knowledge,
or understanding, of the meaning of a certain action does not necessarily
imply that antisocial impulses are controlled or that morally appropriate
choices are made. As Jeffrey Rosen has asserted, “you can have a
horrendously damaged brain where someone knows the difference between
right and wrong but nonetheless can’t control their behavior. At that point,

245
See, e.g., Michael Koenigs, The Role of Prefrontal Cortex in Psychopathy, 23 REV.
NEUROSCI. 253 (2012); Julian Motzkin et al., Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex is Critical for
the Regulation of Amygdala Activity in Humans, 77 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 276 (2015).
246
Mendez, supra note 184, at 611.
247
See Buckholtz et al., supra note 212, at 13.
248
Id.
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you’re dealing with a broken machine, and concepts like punishment and
evil and sin become utterly irrelevant.” 249
In sum, a rational moral agent appears to be one who retains
sufficient capacities for choosing appropriate moral conduct, regardless of
whether or not he or she is able to verbally determine whether that conduct
is either right or wrong. Accordingly, not only should “self-control” and
“knowledge” be evaluated and assessed separately, but the role that
emotional faculties play in affecting self-control abilities should also be
reconsidered.
IV. A TRIPARTITE TEST FOR LEGAL INSANITY
Neuroscientific insights into emotions and moral decision-making
highlight that criminal law’s ascriptions of the capacity for moral rationality
to an alleged overriding cognitive sphere is limited and incomplete. As
noted above, moral behavior is an integrated core of intertwined functions
(i.e., cognitive and emotional) which only together may properly contribute
to an individual’s practical reasoning in accordance with the
moral/normative requirements. 250 It is flawed and unrealistic to maintain
the view that higher cognition is the sole—or even the principal—
controlling function of morally rational decision-making and behavior.
Emotions and emotional processes significantly contribute to the mental
equilibrium that allows individuals to behave in accordance with social,
moral, and legal rules.
249
Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 11, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html?pagewanted=al
[https://perma.cc/NQ8V-MNKG].
250
See Patricia Greenspan, Practical Reasoning and Emotion, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF RATIONALITY 206 (Alfred Mele & Piers Rawling eds., 2004) (arguing that the
neuroscientific insights into emotions suggest that practical reasoning relies upon
normal emotional development and functioning). Considering their guidance role,
Greenspan holds that emotions are factors in our practical reasoning for two main reasons.
First, emotions reinforce nonemotional reasons—e.g., desires, beliefs. By evaluating brute
facts or stimuli through the attachment of positive or negative valences, emotions yield
further non-emotional reasons “to sustain the conditions that make the evaluation
appropriate.” Id. This implies an understanding of emotions in normative terms, as providing
or expressing reasons for actions. For instance, feeling moral guilt at the prospect of doing a
given act can involve a negative moral judgment that the act is morally wrong along with an
aversion to that act. This feeling of guilt might be an input to our desires and beliefs, and
thus to our overall moral reasoning up to our behavioral outcome. Second, emotion provides
evaluative propositions—e.g., that something might cause harm— and thus anticipate
practical eventualities of actions or situations, thereby making an individual react
accordingly. Therefore, when an actor chooses to do something for a reason, he does so on
the basis of some sort of pro attitude toward actions of a certain kind, that is, some emotional
commitment to it, whatever it is.
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A reexamination of the role of emotions within the capacity for moral
rationality entails an expansion of the relevant mental substance underlying
the legal notion of insanity and produces two significant consequences for
insanity tests. The first concerns the recognition of severe emotional
deficits as eligible conditions for the insanity defense. The second concerns
a different conception of volitional capacity as a multi-faceted construct
involving a variety of functions (both cognitive and emotional): functions
that are not necessarily related to the cognitive faculties of knowledge and
understanding.
Altogether, such a reexamination would lead insanity tests to become
tripartite and more dimensional, i.e., inclusive of cognitive, emotional, and
volitional prongs. The cognitive prong would equate to an intellectual
capacity test—that is, a test measuring the defendant’s knowledge or
understanding of the factual and moral meaning of his or her conduct. The
emotional prong would equate to an emotional capacity test—that is, a test
measuring the defendant’s capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral
significance of his or her conduct. The volitional prong would equate to a
control test—that is, a test measuring the defendant’s capacity to control his
or her impulses. Importantly, the volitional prong would be reconsidered to
include emotion within its relevant application. Also, the volitional prong
would be autonomous from the cognitive prong.
Expanding the substance of the volitional prong to incorporate
emotional components also has consequences for the diminished capacity
doctrine, as it is regulated by both the common law “heat of passion” and
the MPC’s EED standards. In fact, rethinking the relationship between
volition and emotion within insanity standards—that is, accepting that
volitional impairments also meet insanity criteria when they are due to
severe emotional dysfunctions—implies placing insanity and diminished
capacity on a continuum, as the requirements to meet insanity and
diminished-capacity standards would be the same.
Therefore, the
difference between insanity and diminished capacity proves to be purely
quantitative, and diminished capacity is transformed into a “generic partial
excuse” (or, perhaps more correctly, “generic partial insanity”), thereby
integrating and supporting the validity of Professor Stephen Morse’s
argument for introducing such a doctrine in Anglo-American criminal law.
A. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE COGNITIVE PRONG

As discussed, criminal law attributes the mental substance of insanity
exclusively to cognition. Traditionally, the cognitive dimension is
responsible both for agents’ cognitive faculties of understanding and
knowing the factual and moral meaning of their conduct, and for their
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volitional faculties of self-control as a consequence. Enriching the
substance of the capacity for moral rationality with the contribution of
emotion clearly implies the limitation of attributing such an absolute role to
cognition within insanity tests.
Very simply, cognition remains the mental dimension that governs the
evaluation in the cognitive prong of the insanity test: it remains responsible
for the evaluation of one’s capacity to propositionally understand the
factual and moral meaning of his or her actions. The “factual knowledge”
test remains one that measures whether an agent possessed a sufficient
degree of cognitive or intellectual functioning to retain a factual
understanding and knowledge of his or her action in a given context. For
example, as some authors have suggested, the evaluation of this specific
mental prong would encompass an agent’s IQ level. 251 Regarding the
“moral knowledge” test, because cognitive mechanisms are surely
responsible for enabling agents’ verbal understanding and knowledge of the
moral significance of their actions (i.e., telling right from wrong), the new
model of legal insanity retains the role of cognitive intelligence as mental
source of agents’ understanding and knowledge of the moral significance of
their actions.
The difference with respect to the traditional model of legal insanity is
that cognition is no longer treated as the sole mental faculty in charge of
volitional faculties. This difference, of course, does not mean to deny that
cognitive faculties contribute to one’s capacity for self-control. As
previously discussed, volitional processes involve their own mechanisms,
both cognitive and emotional. 252 However, these mechanisms stand on
their own; that is, they are not necessarily related to one’s cognitive
understanding and knowledge of the factual or moral significance of a
given behavior, or its consequences. Thus, the “separation” of volition
from cognition is simply intended to eliminate the “dependence” of the
control test on the knowledge test, and thus to support a view of the
volitional prong as an autonomous test.
B. INCLUDING AN EMOTIONAL PRONG

The empirical sciences reveal that people appreciate
moral significance of their acts, not only of their cognitive
an act is wrong, but also of their experience of the usual
associated with that act. 253 Critically, neuroscientific (and
251
252
253

See supra note 215, at 31.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.A.

the social and
awareness that
moral feelings
psychological)
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studies indicate that possessing verbal or instrumental knowledge of
something is not synonymous with being capable of moral decision-making
and behavior if the relevant emotions are lacking. 254 On the contrary, the
existence of the former in the absence of the latter is a potential description
Thus, emotional
of abnormal or even pathological conditions. 255
appreciation, in addition to intellectual awareness, should more correctly be
viewed as an integral component of the capacities for moral rationality that
form the mental preconditions of culpability and responsibility. 256
Giving prominence to the emotional sphere within the capacity for
moral rationality implies that an emotional prong would be explicitly
included within an insanity ruling. The emotional prong of insanity tests
would assess agents’ capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral
significance of their actions. Consequently, agents are potentially not
culpable as long as they display such a disrupted emotional system that they
are unable to perceive the rightness or wrongness of their actions,
regardless of their verbal understanding or knowledge of the factual or
moral facets of those actions. The emotional prong would thus measure
whether the defendant in question possessed sufficient emotional capacities
typically involved in moral judgments and behavior—for example, the
capacity to feel empathic concern—in order to evaluate whether he or she
was able to also perceive, or appreciate, the moral significance of the
criminal act he or she committed.
To make these claims more solid, what follows examines which
tangible effects the acceptance of emotional capacity as part of insanity
tests could have on current insanity standards. Turning first to M’Naghten,
the intellectual test it contains requires that a “defect of reason” arising
from a “disease of [the] mind,” must impair the defendant’s ability to
“know” the nature and quality of the act he or she was committing, as well
as his or her capacity to know that the act was wrong. 257 The inclusion of
an emotional prong in the formulation and the substance of the M’Naghten
rule would therefore have an impact on three different levels: first, the
meaning of “reason”; second, the meaning of “disease of [the] mind”; and
third, the meaning of “know.”
Let us begin with “reason.”
According to traditional legal
understandings, the concept of “reason”—as capacity for moral
254

Id.
Id.
256
See ST. JOHN’S L. REV., supra note 33, at 250 (“While an individual may understand
both the nature of his act and its wrongfulness [cognition], he may nevertheless, due to
mental illness . . . be so emotionally deranged [affection] as to be irresponsible.”).
257
R. v. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
255
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rationality—encompasses only cognitive faculties. The discussion above,
however, has suggested that the capacity for moral judgment and behavior
also requires and depends on the normal functioning of emotional faculties,
enabling an individual to also feel the moral significance of his or her
actions. Thus, the defect-of-reason clause is no longer to be understood as
an intellect-based defect of moral rationality but encompasses a broader
notion of the capacity for moral rationality: one that also embraces
emotional faculties.
If the scope of the word “reason” expands to also include emotional
components, it follows that the concept of the sort of “disease of [the]
mind” that can cause such a defect of reason must change and be expanded
accordingly. That is, the disease-of-the-mind clause would also encompass
severe emotional abnormalities as eligible conditions that may lead to a
disruption of the capacity for moral rationality.
What is more, a broadening of both notions (“defect of reason” and
“disease of [the] mind”) would inevitably lead to an expansion of the scope
of the word “know” in a way that gives more weight to emotional
components. However, to avoid conceptual and interpretive confusion, a
more precise formulation of the test could maintain the knowledge
requirement as an indicator in the cognitive test, but add an explicit
provision for an emotional prong, which would require proof of the
person’s lack of emotional appreciation of the moral significance of his or
her criminal act.
Consequently, a potential reformulation of the M’Naghten test that
considers the emotional prong reads as follows:
To establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proven that, at
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of moral rationality, from impairment of the party’s cognitive or emotional
capacities, or both, of such extent as to lack the capacity to know the nature and
quality of the act he or she was doing or to appreciate emotionally that the act was
legally and morally wrong.

Regarding the ALI test, the current formulation seems to be more
consistent with an emotionally informed understanding of the relevant
capacities for moral rationality. In fact, the verb “to appreciate” seems to
also contain an emotional test. As noted above, however, this term has
caused much controversy because it is unclear how broadly it should be
understood. 258
Regardless of whether the verb “to appreciate” would be better
interpreted more narrowly (as solely cognitive) or more broadly (as
encompassing emotion), it can generate confusion. In fact, by attributing to
258

See discussion supra Part I.A.
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the word “appreciate” both cognitive and emotional meaning, the line
between these two forms of meaning could become excessively blurred.
Ultimately, the risk would remain that relevance continues to be attributed
solely to cognitive defects, without dedicating significant consideration to
the emotional defects. Moreover, if one accepts that emotional (in)capacity
plays a definite and autonomous role in moral judgments, it would appear
to be more correct to split the word “appreciate” into two different
requirements, such as knowing and emotionally appreciating the criminality
of one’s conduct.
The provision of Section 4.01(1) would therefore read as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of a mental disease or disorder, causing
impairment of his or her cognitive or emotional capacities, or both,
he or she lacked substantial capacity either to understand the
factual and moral meaning of his or her conduct, or to appreciate
emotionally the moral significance of his or her conduct . . . .
Admittedly, introducing an explicit emotional prong in the first
paragraph of the ALI test poses some challenges for the caveat paragraph
contained in Section 4.01(2). Specifically, if emotional capacity becomes a
prong of the insanity test, then the rationale of the caveat paragraph
seemingly becomes meaningless. Admittedly, the categories of people to
which the paragraph actually refers, namely psychopaths and more broadly
people suffering from disorders that are characterized by severe socioaffective deficits, would become eligible for an insanity plea by virtue of
the test’s newly introduced emotional prong.
The caveat paragraph, however, should not be eliminated and should
continue serving its deterrent function, although to a different extent. Not
all “repeated manifestations of criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct” are
symptomatic of pathological emotional deficits, 259 nor do emotional deficits
necessarily lead to antisocial behavior. For emotional deficits to potentially
exculpate defendants, it must be convincingly proven that they are
sufficiently severely pathological to have a seriously compromised capacity
for moral judgment at the time of the crime. Of course, it would be up to
juries—with the help of expert witnesses—to evaluate and assess, case by
case, the pathological seriousness of emotional derangements within the
domain of insanity pleas. This sort of assessment is not new compared to
what has been done to date with traditional tests.

259

Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1970) (correctly pointing out
that “[i]t is practically inconceivable that mental disease or defect would . . . be manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct”).
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C. INTEGRATING EMOTIONS IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VOLITIONAL
PRONG

The third feature of the new model of insanity concerns making the
volitional prong (i.e., the capacity to choose which type of conduct to
engage in and therefore to exert self-control) independent of the cognitive
one. As observed above, the volitional prong in insanity tests plays a
secondary role in comparison to the cognitive prong. Indeed, some insanity
standards (e.g., the M’Naghten test) do not include an explicit control test at
all, thereby placing the burden of insanity entirely on the cognitive
knowledge test. Other tests, however, do require that agents are capable of
controlling their impulses at the time of the crime and therefore also of
conforming their behavior to what the law prescribes (according to the
MPC model). 260 However, even in this case, the autonomy of the volitional
prong proves to be mostly theoretical and poorly applied.
As previously discussed, neither of these two conceptions of volitional
incapacity explicitly consider the emotional dimension. The reason, as set
out above, is that emotions are not considered to be part of what comprises
the capacity for moral rationality. Therefore, even when emotions are
impaired and provoke a lack of self-control, the law does not understand
this condition to entail a lack of moral rationality that could serve as
grounds for an excuse. 261 Ergo, when the lack of self-control depends on a
cognitive defect—that is, when a person is not able to control his or her
impulses and to conform his or her behavior due to an altered perception of
reality—this condition constitutes reasonable grounds for an insanity
defense. 262 However, when the lack of self-control is due to an emotional
defect—i.e., when a person is not able to control his or her impulses
because of an extreme (pathological) emotional disturbance—this condition
is not considered to form acceptable grounds for an insanity defense. 263
Rather, a lack of self-control due to emotional impairments alone at best
constitutes a mitigating factor, one that could lead to the recognition of a
lesser degree of culpability in terms of the degree of crime, as in the EED
defense provided by the MPC.
As discussed above, self-control appears to rely upon a variety of
distinct cognitive and socio-emotional processes, each of which contributes
to individuals’ control abilities.264 Importantly, preserved functioning in

260
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262
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264

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.C.
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one of these processes may still be accompanied by poor functioning in
others. 265 Furthermore, the processes involved in self-control may be
irrespective of an individual’s moral knowledge or understanding of his or
her conduct. Thus, even if an individual is able to know right from wrong,
he or she may still be unable—due to a disruption affecting self-control
mechanisms (either cognitive or emotional)—to apply that knowledge to
action.
If insanity standards were based on a definition that accepted this
broader and multi-faceted vision of volitional capacity, then an incapacity
for self-control would be allotted the same amount of relevance regardless
of whether it is the result of severe emotional or cognitive defects. Thus,
the substance of volitional incapacity could be reconceptualized as an
incapacity to choose which conduct to engage in, resulting from deficits in
either cognitive or emotional processes involved in self-control abilities.
Importantly, this evaluation would be autonomous and irrespective of the
cognitive faculties of knowledge and understanding.
The reconceptualization of the volitional prong as an autonomous
prong would have diverse implications for different insanity standards. Let
us begin with the M’Naghten rule. As previously discussed, the traditional
formulation of this test does not encompass a volitional component. The
reason, as elaborated above, lies in the fact that the test presumes cognition
to be the only relevant mental dimension responsible for moral behavior, as
it produces the knowledge of the nature and quality of an act, as well as of
whether the act violates society’s morals. If one is in possession of this
knowledge, then he or she is presumed to be able to control any impulses.
Accepting that volitional processes have their own cognitive and
emotional mechanisms, which are irrespective of one’s cognitive faculties
of knowledge and understanding, implies that the narrow cognitive test
contained in the M’Naghten rule would be expanded to also include a
volitional capacity test. A potential re-formulation of the test with the
introduction of a volitional prong, in addition to a cognitive and an
emotional one, reads as follows:
To establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was
laboring under a defect of moral rationality, from impairment of the party’s
cognitive and/or emotional capacities, or both, of such extent as to lack the
capacity to know the nature and quality of his or her act, to appreciate
emotionally that the act was wrong, or to conform his or her behavior to his
or her knowledge or appreciation.
265

Id.
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The same mechanism can be applied to the ALI test. Reconsidering
the control test contained in Section 4.01(1) of the MPC from the
perspective of an understanding of volitional capacity that also depends on
emotional factors, this provision can be reformulated as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of a mental disease or disorder, causing
impairment of his or her cognitive or emotional capacities, or both,
he or she lacked substantial capacity . . . to control his or her
conduct in the circumstances and thus to conform his or her
conduct to the requirements of the law.
As this reformulation makes clear, the introduction of an emotionoriented notion of volitional (in)capacity would have no substantial impact
on the ALI test, in the sense that it would simply specify the substance of
the control test without significantly altering the test’s original formulation.
The new formulation proposed here would simply make the test more
specific, so as to overcome the conceptual imprecisions that the current text
contains and to ensure there less space for interpretive uncertainty.
D. RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY AS GENERIC PARTIAL
INSANITY

In addition to affecting the insanity doctrine, an emotion-oriented
paradigm of the capacity for moral rationality may have significant
repercussions for the diminished-capacity doctrine—such as the common
law’s “heat of passion,” the provocation or passion doctrine, or EED
doctrine adopted by the MPC and several single statutes in the US.
Let us briefly recapitulate on both the provocation or passion and the
EED doctrines. 266 Both doctrines are substantially characterized by a lack
of control due to an emotional breakdown at the time of the crime, whereby
the former is due to a provocation, and the latter is due to an EED for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, regardless of whether there was
any previous provocation. The rationale underlying both doctrines is that a
temporary lapse of control due to an intense emotional breakdown reduces,
albeit temporarily, an individual’s rationality at the time of the crime. 267
Even so, the law does not treat this type of lack of self-control as an actual
moral rationality defect. In fact, the scope of such mitigations is to lessen
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See supra Part II.B.
State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 11–12 (Wash. 1915) (“The doctrine of mitigation is
briefly this: That if the act of killing, though intentional, be committed under the influence of
sudden, intense anger, or heat of blood, obscuring the reason, produced by an adequate or
reasonable provocation, and before sufficient time has elapsed for the blood to cool and
reason to reassert itself.”).
267
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only the degree of the crime, not the perpetrator’s overall culpability. 268
Also (and herein lies another paradox), both doctrines are limited to
reducing murder to manslaughter, and neither can be applied to crimes in
general.
The contradictory nature of the diminished-capacity doctrine has given
rise to several critiques. One compelling argument against the current state
of the diminished-capacity doctrine has been offered by Stephen Morse, 269
who vigorously affirms that diminished capacity should take on broader
connotations. Morse acknowledges that, contrary to the “all-or-nothing
doctrines” adopted by current criminal law, capacities for moral rationality,
including self-control, are continuum concepts. 270 In view of the fact that
people “display an enormously wide range of rational and control
capacities,” 271 a truly fair judgment of culpability and responsibility, as well
as a fair determination of punishment, must consider the kinds of
impairments that affect one’s rationality to some significant degree, even if
they do not entirely compromise it. 272 Furthermore, Morse rightly indicates
that limiting the diminished-capacity doctrine to homicide alone is
pointless, considering that any crime can be committed by a defendant
whose rational capacities are to some degree impaired. 273 The applicability
of the mitigating factors in the present EED and heat of passion defenses
should be extended to cover all crimes. With this in mind, Morse proposes
the adoption of an additional verdict, namely the “Guilty but Partially
Responsible” verdict, as a new general affirmative defense that “requires a
substantial diminution in rationality because less serious impairments are
sufficient to warrant lesser blame and punishment.” 274
Morse’s argument remains intentionally vague about the kinds of
mental impairments that may meet the requirements of the generic partial
excuse he proposes. 275 He argues that the generic partial responsibility
excuse should apply in cases of less severe rationality defects, which
implies cognitive and—irrespective of whether they are clearly provided for
268

See supra Part II.B.
Morse, supra note 129.
270
Id. at 296.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 302 (“Perhaps the law should adopt a generic mitigation that would consider
degrees of rationality and responsibility diminution.”).
273
Id. at 296 (“Compromised rationality and its effect on culpability are not limited to
homicide. Fairness and proportionality require that doctrinal mitigation should be available
in all cases in which culpability is substantially reduced.”).
274
Id. at 299–304.
275
Id. at 301 (“I would trust legislative judgment or the common law process to identify
which rationality-diminishing factors would be justified.”).
269
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in the text—self-control defects. 276 These are basically the same kinds of
defects (though in a lesser degree) that warrant a designation of insanity.
Morse also argues that the partial generic excuse he proposes would
have the effect of extending the applicability of the heat of passion and
EED doctrines to all crimes, thereby implying that loss of self-control
arising from emotional disturbance should also be considered a rationality
defect. 277 In so arguing, Morse seems to implicitly attribute relevance to
the emotional factor in matters of self-control and, more broadly,
rationality.
If this interpretation is correct, then Morse’s theory of diminished
capacity lends support to the emotion-oriented descriptions of moral
rationality and insanity proposed here. In fact, building on an emotionenriched view of the capacity for moral rationality, and consequently of
self-control, the net distinction between the kinds of mental impairments
necessary to warrant insanity and those needed to warrant diminished
capacity prove meaningless. Once one recognizes that emotions also play a
role in the capacity for moral rationality, including self-control, there is no
reason to maintain a doctrinal distinction between volitional impairments
due to cognitive defects and volitional impairments due to emotional
defects. Rather, by making emotions an integral part of the capacity for
moral rationality that grounds the insanity defense, it follows that the kinds
of requirements that ground both doctrines are exactly the same, though to
different degrees. That is, diminished capacity would become a concept in
continuum with insanity.
Furthermore, as Morse correctly points out, a generic partial excuse
should apply in all cases of partial rationality defects. In combining this
application of the generic partial excuse with the updated notion of the
capacity for moral rationality, also including an emotional prong, it follows
that a generic partial excuse would not apply only in cases in which a
defendant’s mental conditions impair to some degree his or her cognitive
276

Id. at 295–98 (“I claim that the best interpretation of our moral and criminal law
excusing practices is that there are only two basic excusing conditions: diminished
rationality and ‘hard choice.’ . . . [T]here is a limited need for an excuse based on an
impaired capacity for self-control. The capacity for rationality, the ‘hardness’ of choice, and
the capacity for control are all continuum concepts. Nonetheless, with precious few
exceptions, present criminal law contains doctrinal all-or-nothing, bright line
tests . . . . Present law is unfair because it does not sufficiently permit mitigating
claims . . . . The solution to all these problems of potential doctrinal deformation is a generic
mitigating excuse.”).
277
Id. at 295 (“Provocation/passion and extreme mental or emotional disturbance as
partially excusing mitigating doctrines are best explained by the theory that these conditions
non-culpably reduce the capacity for rationality.”).
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and volitional faculties, but also when these conditions compromise his or
her emotional capacities. This means that the mental diseases or disorders
that could lead to a total insanity verdict could also lead to a generic partial
excuse or—perhaps more correctly—a partial insanity verdict, depending
on their intensity and the degree to which the defendant’s cognitive,
emotional, and volitional capacities are compromised. Thus, the substance
of the generic partial insanity tests would be tailored to that of “total”
insanity tests, with any difference between these two doctrines being
merely quantitative, not qualitative. Importantly, turning the diminishedcapacity doctrine (as it currently stands) into a partial-insanity doctrine
further confirms the pointlessness of limiting the application of the
diminished-capacity doctrine to homicide.
On a final note, the provision for a partial insanity doctrine raises two
sets of normative issues. First, the law should determine what degree of
impairment is needed to fall within either of the two forms of insanity.
Second, the law should determine what kind of sentence could follow a
partial insanity verdict. These issues, though critical, go beyond the scope
of this article. Further research is needed to explore them in more detail
and to set a hypothetical normative framework that regulates the
implementation of this newly introduced partial excuse.
V. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AN EMOTION-ORIENTED MODEL
OF LEGAL INSANITY
The model of legal insanity proposed here is vulnerable to criticism.
Admittedly, “[u]neasiness about science’s interference with legal
understandings of cognition and responsibility, along with law’s outmoded
view of mental illness, work concurrently to frustrate the progress of [the
insanity] defense based on neurobiological evidence,” as one author
wrote. 278 Also, attempts to root the substance of the insanity defense in
more scientific grounds are not new to psychiatry or legal scholarship.
(Neuro)psychiatry and the (neuro)behavioral sciences in general have
adopted and suggested a far-reaching understanding of mental disease, one
that also encompasses affective and volitional disorders. 279
278
Jozsef Meszaos, Achieving the Peace of Mind: The Benefits of Neurobiological
Evidence for Battered Women Defendants, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMIN. 117, 172 (2011).
279
See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013) (“A mental disorder is a syndrome
characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion
regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or
developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually
associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important
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Notwithstanding, criminal law has intentionally remained mired in an
intellectualist model of mental normalcy and therefore also of mental
abnormality. 280
In addition to the historical reasons illustrated above, the rationale
underlying this position is especially one of criminal justice policy. 281
Indeed, the currently dominant intellectualistic conception of insanity is
intended to meet the retributive, 282 deterrent, 283 social-control, and socialsecurity 284 needs of criminal justice. While I comprehend the legal and
crimino-political arguments for keeping a narrow model of legal insanity,
these reasons are neither absolute nor insurmountable. There are at least
three normative counterarguments that can be offered in support of an
expanded model of insanity that takes into account emotional components:
1) an emotion-oriented model of legal insanity is in greater compliance with
the principle of personal guilt; 2) an emotion-oriented model of legal
insanity is more able to grasp the essence of blameworthiness and just

activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such
as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder.”).
280
See Dillard S. Gardner, Insanity as a Defense in the North Carolina Criminal Law,
30 N.C. L. REV. 4, 7 (1951) (“For example, the notion that intelligence may be separated
from the volitional and emotional life of an individual appears absurd and fantastic to most
scientists, but appears to be taken for granted in legal theory.”).
281
Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent
United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1481–
82 (2006) (“The insanity defense addresses the policy issues inherent in the question of
criminal culpability . . . . Society’s recognition of a moral difference between the acts of a
sane person and a mentally ill person results in the insanity defense serving dual roles in the
criminal justice system: 1) as a way to distinguish between offenders who are able to
conform their conduct to the law as a result of punishment from those offenders who are not
able to conform their conduct to the law despite punishment, and 2) as a method of ensuring
offenders posing a threat to society are restrained.”).
282
Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Abolishing the Insanity Defense Violates Due
Process, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 488, 489 (2013) (“In the criminal justice system,
an offender who lacks the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions as the
result of severe mental disorder does not deserve full blame and punishment.”).
283
Id. (“[O]ffenders cannot be appropriately deterred because the rules of law and
morality cannot adequately guide them.”).
284
Wallace A. MacBain, Insanity Defense: Conceptual Confusion and the Erosion of
Fairness, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1983) (“[M]an possesses a free will, a capacity to
make rational choices for which he should be held accountable . . . mentally abnormal
offenders, determined to be nonresponsible and thus beyond the reach of criminal law, will
be subjected to alternative rehabilitation and preventative mechanisms to assure adequate
social control . . . one appropriate function of the insanity defense is the identification and
exculpation of one whose capacity for free choice has been so diminished as to warrant a
characterization of nonresponsibility with the consequent invocation of alternative social
control mechanisms.”).
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deserts that lie at the core of retributive punishment; and 3) an emotionoriented model of legal insanity strengthens the aims of rehabilitation.
A. PERSONAL GUILT

In “Law and Psychiatry,” Michael Moore claims that criminal law
does and should settle for its folk psychological descriptions of human
thought—even though they may be limited—because that is all the law
needs to hold someone criminally responsible. 285 As he writes:
The very abstract view of persons in terms of autonomy and rationality is of course
radically incomplete as a picture of any person we know. In particular, left out is
the life of the emotions where, if anywhere, the ‘affection of other men’ is gained.
Yet the radical incompleteness of the law’s view of a person is no argument that it
is wrong. As far as it goes, the law’s view of persons could be quite correct even if
radically incomplete. 286

Moore’s claim that the legal approach may remain true although it is
radically incomplete exposes itself to criticism. This is because the
incompleteness of the practical reasoning and decision-making conditions
underlying the traditional conception of culpability and culpability
doctrines is precisely a means of evading the truth regarding how
individuals reason and make decisions in moral contexts, such as decisions
concerned with offending.
Moving from this claim, the first argument for rethinking insanity with
the aid of neuroscience draws on the normative consideration that criminal
law’s reduction of blameworthiness to the dimension of cognition contrasts
with the universal principle of personal guilt. Here, the word “personal”
does not denote only that culpability can be attributed only to the actual
perpetrator of a given criminal wrongdoing. Rather, it also indicates that
culpability needs to be based on an individual’s actual mental and moral
participation in the commission of an offence, that is, he or she internally
approves of the act and decides to act in breach of legally protected values.
Slightly differently formulated, a criminal act must belong to the mental
and moral domain of the perpetrator, and must express his or her disregard,
or lack of concern, for the interests of other individuals protected by the
law.
Ultimately, this is what makes a given unlawful behavior
blameworthy.
To comply with the principle of personal guilt, the notion of
culpability must embrace all relevant mental factors that contribute to an
individual’s moral decision to act unlawfully. In this respect, I agree fully
with Kimberly Ferzan’s proposal for a “holistic” understanding of
285
286

MOORE, supra note 29, at 112.
Id.
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culpability, according to which culpability is understood as the sum of
practical reasoning and decision-making conditions underlying any
blameworthy state of mind. 287 As Ferzan asserts, “[it is precisely] the sum
of these parts that gives rise to our normative judgment about whether the
actor’s reasoning gave due regard to the interests of others [i.e., whether it
is blameworthy or not].” 288 While Ferzan’s holistic account of culpability
is very accurate in grasping the essence of the notion of personal guilt, it
should be noted that the descriptive, cognition-based model of culpability
(and of culpability-related doctrines, such as insanity), is not sufficient to
effectively depict an individual’s attitude of disregard for legally protected
values—that is, his or her blameworthiness.
In view of the illustrated (neuro)scientific teachings about moral
judgments and antisocial behavior, it is clear that the decision to engage in
moral types of behaviors—such as criminal behavior 289—involves a far
more complex mechanism in which emotional factors, and not only the
cognitive ones, play a critical role. Therefore, the blameworthy essence of
one’s decision to act against legally protected values cannot only be found
in neutral cognitive states, but also and more extensively in the affective
mechanisms that underlie and drive an individual’s judgment to opt for
immoral, rather than moral conduct.
If culpability is viewed as the sum of the agent’s practical reasoning
and decision-making conditions leading up to criminal actions, and since
emotions are factors in the practical reasoning and decision-making
conditions leading up to such actions, it follows that a notion of culpability
that truly complies with the principle of personal guilt should also require
that individuals possess sufficient emotional soundness at the time of the
offence.
B. CULPABILITY-BASED RETRIBUTION

Retribution essentially punishes perpetrators for two reasons: the first,
which is objective, is that the perpetrators do wrong acts (harm-based
retribution); the second, which is subjective, is that the perpetrators know
that the acts they do are wrong, and yet choose to act upon their antisocial
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Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Holistic Culpability, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2523

(2007).
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Id. at 2544.
See Per-Olof H. Wilkström & Kyle Treiber, The Role of Self-Control in Crime
Causation, 4 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 237, 244–45 (2007) (describing crimes as “moral
actions,” i.e. actions that follow or break moral rules, and hence are “guided by what is right
and what is wrong to do”).
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impulses (culpability-based retribution). 290 Central to any retributive
punishment is the premise of moral blameworthiness, which
presupposes moral rationality. 291 Thus, the perpetrators ultimately deserve
punishment precisely because they are rational individuals who consciously
choose to act immorally and do harm.
The understanding of moral rationality that underlies and justifies
retributive punishment is grounded in the same cognition-based
psychological assumptions about the mental ingredients of moral rationality
as those that ground culpability. 292 Only an individual with a solid
intellectual capacity is assumed to be able to make a conscious decision to
engage in conduct that rejects his or her community’s moral norms and,
consequently, to appreciate the retributive force of the punishment for his or
her misconduct. 293 On the contrary, it makes no sense to punish someone
who is not able to comprehend the retributive path of punishment. From
this perspective, retribution is the logical conclusion of a normative
syllogism, the premise of which is precisely a cognition-based view of
moral rationality and hence of culpability. If culpability presupposes
intellect-based moral rationality, and retribution presupposes culpability,
then punishment is justified as long as it is directed to individuals who are
provided with the intellectual faculties that make them morally rational.
If the premises of this syllogism are changed, the conclusions
inevitably also change. In fact, if the substance of the capacity for moral
rationality, and hence of culpability, is enriched with certain emotional
faculties, it follows that punishment is justified only when these conditions
are also met. Differently said, if being an individual capable of moral
rationality, and consequently of moral blameworthiness, also requires
possessing specific emotional capacities, then retributive punishment is
justified as long as it is addressed to people who do possess these
capacities. Because mentally diseased or disordered individuals cannot
justifiably be punished for their acts on the grounds that they do not possess
290
See Beatrice R. Maidman, The Legal Insanity Defense: Transforming the Legal
Theory into a Medical Standard, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1831, 1843–44 (2016).
291
MOORE, supra note 29, at 244.
292
Richard L. Lippke, Retribution and Incarceration, 17 PUB. AFF. QUART. 29, 43
(“Retributivism insists that legal punishment be structured so that, at a minimum, it is
consistent with treating offenders as moral beings capable of understanding the wrongs they
have committed and the fairness of the penal sanctions imposed on them by the state in
response to those wrongs.”).
293
See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1424 (2003) (observing that
“culpability-based retributivists believe that the actor’s subjective awareness of wrongdoing
triggers blameworthiness and makes the actor eligible for punishment”).
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the relevant capacities for moral rationality—including the emotional
capacities—then a legal insanity defense has to be sufficiently broad to
encompass people whose mental illnesses rendered them unable to be
morally rational at the time of the crime.
In addition to these theoretical considerations, an expanded notion of
legal insanity would also solve one of the main practical paradoxes of the
criminal justice system, namely punishing mentally ill individuals with
(often severe) socio-emotional impairments on the sole grounds that they do
retain a cognitive capacity to know, or to understand, what they did at the
time of the crime and that what they did was wrong. The practical and
paradoxical result is that these people get sentenced to a given penalty (let
us assume medium- to long-term imprisonment) without actually being
able, due to their mental illness, to perceive, appreciate, or follow the “reeducative” path that retributive punishment is intended to incite. In
addition, conventional punishment significantly undermines their successful
reentry into the community and social reintegration subsequent to serving a
(prison) sentence. 294
C. REHABILITATION

The model of insanity proposed here would also better suit the
purposes of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation presupposes that punishment is
justified as long as it can provide individuals with the means to be socially
functional and, thus, to return to society as law-abiding citizens. 295 To
accomplish the goals of rehabilitation, adjudication and sentencing must be
as careful and individualized as possible; that is, they must be tailored to the
actual needs of individual perpetrators. 296 The inclusion of emotional
capacities in the legal notion of insanity would definitely allow for a more
accurate evaluation of an individual’s personality in relation to the crime
committed. It may also offer a defendant who suffers from a severe mental
illness (aside from cognitive diseases) 297 that appears to have affected his or
294
See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., The Effects of Serious Mental Illness on Offender
Reentry, 68 FED. PROB. 45 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/68_2_9_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUU2-BY6Q].
295
See Rehabilitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 1
(Andreas von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
296
Id.
297
The adoption of a tripartite insanity test implies a broadening of the category of
individuals that can potentially fall within the spectrum of this defense. The updated legal
notion of mental illness would also include mental diseases or disorders characterized by a
pathological lack of emotions and moral feelings towards other subjects, as well as those
characterized by severe impairments in behavioral control—as long as it is convincingly
proved that these conditions significantly compromised the person’s ability to refrain from
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her capacity for prosocial behavior to attain access to rehabilitation
programs that ordinary incarceration does not provide.
As previously noted, even in those cases in which a defendant’s
psychiatric diagnosis is one of a mental disease or disorder that
compromises his or her socio-affective faculties, this condition may
nonetheless prove insufficient to meet the legal criteria of insanity, and the
defendant would therefore still be considered entirely punishable. From a
rehabilitative standpoint, as an abundance of literature shows, the result of
punishing these people is the worsening of their socially vulnerable
personalities. 298
At this point, critics could raise two main objections. Foremost, if
current approaches to indefinite commitment of people found “not guilty by
reason of insanity” (NGRI) are continued, prisoners who once would have
been eligible for release after a determinate period of time could now be
held for the rest of their lives—not necessarily something they would
consider a positive development. The second objection is that people with
specific socio-affective disorders, especially psychopathy, are generally
resistant to clinical treatment and have a proclivity to engage in stable
criminal behavior, that is, they are socially dangerous. 299 Admittedly, there
is still little evidence regarding how this class of individuals can be
successfully and appropriately treated. 300
However reasonable in a first gloss, these practical objections are not
insurmountable. Civil libertarian concerns about the risks of rerouting
perpetrators with severely pathological socio-affective problems from the
prison system to the civil commitment system fail to consider the point
made above; that is, conventional incarceration has detrimental effects
antisocial behavior. See George B. Palermo, SEVERE PERSONALITY-DISORDERED
DEFENDANTS AND THE INSANITY PLEA IN THE UNITED STATES: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
(2010), quoted by Ralph Slovenko, Commentary: Personality Disorders and Criminal Law,
37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 182, 183 (2009) (“Individuals who have a severe
personality disorder should be allowed to enter a plea of total or partial insanity based on
evidence of a decompensation into irrational behavior at the time of the alleged crime, and
should be allowed to present all exculpatory evidence available to them to prove their
claim.”).
298
For an excellent empirical and normative analysis of the actual negative impact and
the concrete risks of imprisonment when dealing with prisoners with mental disorders, see E.
Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness,
103(1) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 (2013).
299
See, e.g., James R. P. Ogloff & Melisa Wood, The Treatment of Psychopathy:
Clinical Nihilism or Steps in the Right Direction?, in RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY:
INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY 155 (Luca Malatesti & John McMillan
eds., 2010).
300
Id.
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especially on this class of individuals. 301 Although prison sentences last for
determinate periods of time, when these individuals are confined to a prison
for their sentence, they are released with the same (or even worsened)
mental conditions as they had when they began their sentence.302 In
contrast, if these individuals were rerouted to (an ideally reformed) 303 civil
commitment system, there would be the possibility of dealing with them
more effectively than with conventional incarceration. Ideally, as soon as
they are assessed to no longer pose a threat to themselves and to others,
they would be released with less propensity to engage in socially
dysfunctional behavior as when they began their rehabilitation program.
One option may be the construction or the staffing of specialized
rehabilitation centers—using James Gilligan’s definition, “residential
communities” or “centers for human development” 304—as well as a greater
301
See, e.g., Arielle R. Baskin-Sommers & Karelle Fonteneau, Correctional Change
Through Neuroscience, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 428 (2016) (arguing that the socially
scarce conditions of a prison setting will most likely generate or exacerbate “neurobiological
deficits and maladaptive behaviors . . . . This becomes a significant issue, especially for
individuals who are chronic offenders, where existing neurobiological vulnerabilities are
intensified in settings of confinement and segregation, thereby reinforcing maladaptive
patterns of behavior”); see also James Bonta & Paul Gendreau, Reexamining the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment of Prison Life, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347 (1990).
302
See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 72 (moving a criticism to the caveat
paragraph of the ALI test, the court points out that the exclusion of persons that are
diagnosed as psychopathic but are nonetheless “seriously ill and . . . incapable of persistent,
ordered living of any kind” leaves society unprotected, since after serving their prison
sentence they would be released with the same issues they had at the beginning of their
sentence).
303
As many authors have correctly urged, the civil commitment system should be
profoundly reformed. Current involuntary hospitalization should be replaced with
alternative, less stigmatizing, and less harsh therapeutic approaches, in the most humane and
community-like settings as possible. See, e.g., Richard Bonnie, Reforming Civil
Commitment: Serving Consumers’ Needs While Protecting Their Rights, MENTAL HEALTH L.
3 (2006); Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice, in REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM 251, 320–23, (Erik Luna ed., 2018)
304
See James Gilligan, A Modest Proposal to Universalize the Insanity Defense and
Replace Prisons and Punishment with Treatment and Education, 12 INT’L J. APPLIED
PSYCHOANAL. STUD. 134, 147 (2015) (“What I am recommending in this article is . . . that
we create residential communities that will be more humane and more therapeutic than our
old mental hospitals were, and more than our prisons and jails are today, and adapt them to
the treatment and education not only of those with the major ‘Axis I’ disorders, but also of
those with the major personality disorders that are the main causes of serious or lifethreatening interpersonal violence. . . I would propose that we create an entirely new type of
secure residential college and therapeutic community that could function as a human
development center, in which to enable those . . . who have suffered [and caused others to
suffer] from the physical, emotional and cognitive abuse and deprivation that had prevented
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implementation of outpatient rehabilitation programs when conditions
allow.
Regarding the second objection, the lack of unanimous consensus
about effective clinical treatments for offenders with certain types of mental
disorders—like psychopathy—does not mean that the conventional prison
system is the only or the right response to this particularly thorny class of
individuals, nor that research should lose sight of identifying alternative
ways to deal with them. For instance, the British neuroscientist Daniel
Reisel hypothesizes that empathy training programs in secure, sociallystimulating environments other than prison facilities could be an asset to
treat offenders with socio-affective deficits, such as psychopaths have. 305
He posits that relationally-based situations could prove the most suitable
way to create new opportunities for neural growth in the emotional circuits
of the brain, increasing the likelihood of fostering empathy and sociable
tendencies and enabling these offenders’ positive emotional transformations
towards pro-social attitudes. 306 These insights could lead to an increased
adoption of individualized, inclusionary socio-rehabilitative measures,
which act as positive incentives for high-risk offenders’ emotional healing
and social functioning, thereby reducing risks of recidivism. Admittedly,
very little is known about this avenue of treatment. Ensuring that research
on these alternative treatment options remains a central tenet of future
initiatives is thus crucial. 307
them from achieving the degree of healthy, life-sustaining development and maturation—for
example, development of the emotional capacities for love, care, concern, empathy, and a
sense of responsibility for the welfare of others . . . ”). See also Barbara Dickey et al.,
Therapeutic Communities and Mental Health System Reform, 32 PSYCHIATRIC
REHABILITATION. J. 105 (2008) (describing the value of therapeutic communities to deal with
people with serious mental illness).
305
Daniel Reisel, The Neuroscience of Restorative Justice, TED TALK (Mar. 18, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzJYY2p0QIc [https://perma.cc/K9C4-XUB8].
306
Id.; see also ANDREA L. GLENN & ADRIAN RAINE, PSYCHOPATHY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO BIOLOGICAL FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 170 (2014) (suggesting “[h]ousing
[offenders who are at continuous high risk of committing serious offenses] in a location that
is secure but that practices humane treatment, minimizing aspects of punishment and
allowing the individuals to have as much freedom as possible given the constraints of
keeping such offenders away from society” and proposing “an increased focus on
developing new treatment programs”).
307
See, e.g., the ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder Program (DSPD),’ which
was launched by the UK Government and aimed at dealing with offenders suffering from
personality disorders who posed a significant risk of harm to others and themselves.
Although this arguable initiative was harshly criticized on several grounds—for instance, it
lacked clinical evidence to treat personality disorders, and it allowed preventive detention
for people who had not been convicted of an offence—many authors acknowledge that it
changed political attitudes toward offenders with personality disorders. As Ruth Scally
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CONCLUSION
This article offers a potential approach to how neuroscientific findings
may be used to reshape the doctrine of legal insanity. Its ultimate goal is
not to provide definitive answers to the issues surrounding the insanity
defense, but simply to lay some grounds on which to initiate further debates
in criminal law. Further research is needed to explore the practical
corollaries of this new model of legal insanity. For instance, it would be
necessary to investigate how the newly introduced emotional prong of
insanity standards would be assessed through reliable judgments (both
empirical and normative). Notably, it would be necessary to set parameters
to determine when socio-affective deficits or abnormalities (assessed with
behavioral and, perhaps, neuroscientific measures) could actually support a
judgment of a defendant’s lack of, or severe impairment of, his or her
emotional capacity in relation to the crime committed. Another line of
research could investigate in more detail the dividing line between total and
partial insanity, as well as the sentencing regime following a hypothetical
generic partial insanity verdict. Last, but not least, future research could
enquire after the possible implications of this model of insanity (both total
and partial) for contentious classes of offenders. The most notable example
would be offenders with severe psychopathy. These tasks are by no means
easy and require careful and detailed elaboration at an interdisciplinary
level. Yet practical difficulties should not be used as a reason to not
imagine circumstances in a different light.

observes, although the program no longer exists, “the needs of personality disordered
offenders have remained on political agenda, as demonstrated by the continued investment
in the offender pathway currently being implemented.” Ruth Scally, The DSPD Programme:
What Did It Tell Us About the Future for Managing Dangerous Prisoners with Severe
Personality Disorders?, in MENTAL HEALTH, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RESPONSES AND
REFORMS 184, 194 (Jane Winstone ed., 2016).
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